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THE HIDDEN RISE OF ‘EFFICIENT’ (DE)LISTING 
ZACHARY BRAY∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 What is the value of the gray wolf, and what might be the costs 
of including a tiny desert lizard on the list of endangered species?  
For decades, Congress has formally excluded questions about the 
economic value of species and the costs of their protection from 
agency decisions about whether a species should be listed under 
the Endangered Species Act.  Recently, however, a number of 
federal legislators have sought to incorporate their own ad hoc 
views about the value of individual species in peril, and the costs 
of protecting such species, into listing decisions.  This goal has 
been accomplished through recent legislation designed to remove 
specific listed species from the Endangered Species Act’s protect-
ed ranks or to exempt individual species from the Act altogether. 
 As this Article will show, this delisting and exemption legisla-
tion is not literally unprecedented, though it is often described as 
such.  Nevertheless, I argue that the recent success of this legisla-
tion does represent something new in the long history of conflict 
                                                          
Copyright © 2014 by Zachary Bray. 
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center.  I am grateful to Jamison Colburn, 
Brigham Daniels, Holly Doremus, Adam Gershowitz, Jim Hawkins, Tracy Hester, Julie Hill, 
Blake Hudson, Lee Kovarsky, Jessica Roberts, Asmara Tekle, and Kellen Zale for their helpful 
comments and suggestions regarding the ideas and arguments expressed here and in earlier drafts.  
Thanks also to Katy Stein, Scott Ehlers, Kelly Ferrell, Todd Aaron, and Sandy Hoy for their ex-
cellent research assistance.  All remaining errors are my own. 
 390 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:389 
over wildlife and biodiversity in the United States.  Moreover, the 
success of this recent delisting and exemption legislation has sig-
nificance far beyond its novelty: I argue that it has the potential 
to reshape the fundamental structure of the Endangered Species 
Act, chipping away at the Act’s underlying norms until the entire 
edifice is transformed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades, perhaps the most significant development 
in environmental and natural resources law has been the increased use of, 
and the heightened debate about, economic considerations and cost-benefit 
analysis in legislation and regulation.1  Beginning in the early 1980s, cost-
benefit analysis and broader economic considerations expanded throughout 
environmental and natural resources legislation and regulation.2  At the 
same time, the rise of cost-benefit analysis has attracted the attention of 
many critics who have weighed in against its expansion and increasing 
prominence.3  Accordingly, debates about the merits, extent, and impact of 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553–57, 1583–84 (2002) (criticizing 
the increasing prominence of cost-benefit analysis as “a terrible way to make decisions about en-
vironmental protection”); John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Eco-
nomics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 402–04 (2008) (noting the “universal consensus that” cost-benefit 
analysis “plays a more significant role today than it did a generation ago,” and arguing for its 
“compelling philosophical and practical advantages”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 657–62 (2010) (noting the “enormous litera-
ture” and widespread debate about the role of regulatory cost-benefit analysis since the early 
1980s); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000) (“Over the last decade there has been a sea change in environ-
mental law and policy, marked by growing interest in market-based instruments of environmental 
protection.”).   
 2.  Many scholars and officials with varied policy preferences have defended the expansion 
of cost-benefit analysis and broader economic considerations in environmental and natural re-
sources law.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE, 61–67 (2004) 
(contending that increased use of cost-benefit analysis is necessary to address potentially cata-
strophic risks such as loss of biodiversity and global warming); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL 
A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 11–13 (2008) (arguing that increased use of cost-benefit 
analysis in environmental regulation is both inevitable and desirable, and suggesting that “[n]ow is 
a good time for liberals to enter the [regulatory cost-benefit] conversation”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 3–6, 99 (2002) (con-
trasting cost-benefit analysis with “‘1970s environmentalism,’ a form of thinking that accom-
plished a great deal of good . . . but that also seems increasingly anachronistic, even counterpro-
ductive”). 
 3.  See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 15 (2008) (“Environmentalists have entered a Faustian bargain with economists,” 
selling “their political agency, ethical belief, and aesthetic judgment for numbers used to make 
decisions ‘based almost entirely on economic values’”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. 
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this “cost-benefit turn” have taken on a central importance in environmental 
and natural resource regulation, legislation, and theory.4 
Although the broad arc of environmental and natural resources law has 
been characterized by this general turn toward cost-benefit analysis and 
broader economic considerations, the Endangered Species Act of 19735 
(“ESA”), we are told, is different.6  Even as the cost-benefit turn of recent 
decades has transformed other environmental and natural resources statutes 
and regulatory regimes, the ESA supposedly remains centered around a 
commitment to preserve endangered or threatened species as goods in 
themselves, rather than for their value to human activity or society.7  More 
                                                          
Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
433, 501–02 (2008) (concluding that “[t]he weaknesses of [cost-benefit analysis] are apparent for 
all to see,” and arguing for an alternative regulatory and statutory approach that is “problem-
oriented, normative, discursive and transparent”); Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar & David M. 
Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48, 
55–57, 63–66 (2009) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis creates “especial controversy in the envi-
ronmental context because the parameters” it typically excludes “constitute environmental law’s 
raison d’être”).  
 4.  See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1355 n.36 
(2002) (claiming that cost-benefit analysis “has been ratified by Congress—and applied to regula-
tion—in recent years to a degree that . . . could not have [been] anticipated” in previous decades); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 2, 351, 353 (2005) (“In 
the United States, cost-benefit analysis is in the ascendancy.  For over twenty years, American 
presidents have required . . . agencies to regulate only if the benefits of regulation justify its 
costs.”). 
While the merits and extent of the cost-benefit turn continue to be contested, there is wide-
spread agreement as to its existence and significance.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, 
REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 1–2 
(2010) (stating that “modern American environmental law has been redacted into a familiar script” 
by economic reasoning, and then criticizing this dominant script for impeding environmental im-
provements and distorting moral discourse); Graham, supra note 1, at 402 (“There is dispute about 
how influential [cost-benefit analysis] has become at federal agencies, but there is universal con-
sensus that [it] plays a more significant role today than . . . a generation ago.”); see also Shapiro & 
Schroeder, supra note 3, at 462 (“Notwithstanding the [various] important criticisms, [cost-benefit 
analysis] has remained the dominant policy technique within the federal government,” and is “the 
lingua franca of policy discourse in Washington”).   
 5.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).  
 6.  See, e.g J.B. Ruhl, Past, Present, and Future Trends of the Endangered Species Act, 25 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (“The ESA is not like any other environmental 
law, and its thirty-year history has repeatedly defied convention.”); Amy Sinden, In Defense of 
Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1494 
(2005) (arguing that “the ESA’s absolute standards operate as a ‘trump’ or a thumb on the scale” 
that “serve to counteract the inevitable tug toward economic interests that the environmental pow-
er dynamic produces”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 68–69 (suggesting that the ESA is “the most 
vivid example” in regulatory policy of a situation in which cost-benefit default principles are in-
applicable in principle because it “is concerned with preventing genuinely irreversible losses”).   
 7.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006) (stating that the purposes of the ESA “are to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which . . . [listed] species depend may be conserved [and] to 
provide a program for the conservation of such . . . species”); see also BILL DEVALL & GEORGE 
SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED 126 (1985) (“The biocentric intui-
 392 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:389 
specifically, the core of the ESA—the listing process by which federal 
agencies determine whether a particular species should be subject to the 
statute’s protection—is designed to eschew cost-benefit analysis and ques-
tions about the relative efficiency of protecting a species from extinction.8 
Instead, when deciding whether to list a species as endangered or 
threatened, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) are supposed to focus entirely on the 
best “scientific and commercial data” about the threats or dangers to the 
continued survival of the candidate species.9  Furthermore, the formal struc-
ture of the listing process leaves no room for accommodation with the pro-
spect of “efficient extinction,” for it specifically excludes any consideration 
of the potential economic impact of protecting a particular species.10 
                                                          
tion that species have a right to exist and follow their own evolutionary destinies was established 
in the United States in the Endangered Species Act of 1973.”); Sinden et al., supra note 3, at 57 
(“For instance, the Endangered Species Act as construed in TVA v. Hill . . . would be incompre-
hensible from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 8.  Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (noting that “[t]he plain intent of 
Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, what-
ever the cost”); H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2820 
(stating that “economic considerations have no relevance to determinations regarding the status of 
species” and that “[a]pplying economic criteria . . . to any phase of the species listing process . . . 
is specifically rejected”); see also DONALD C. BAUR & WILLIAM ROBERT IRVIN, Foreward to 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES xiii, xiv (Donald C. Baur & Wil-
liam Robert Irvin, eds., 2002) (invoking 16 U.S.C. § 1533 to note that “[d]ecisions [on listing] are 
to be made ‘solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available,’ and econom-
ics are not taken into account”).   
 9.  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1), 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006) (setting forth the relevant factors for a 
listing determination under the ESA and stating that such determinations shall be made “solely on 
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available”).  The relevant agencies will herein-
after be referred to as “FWS” (Fish and Wildlife Service), “NMFS” (National Marine Fisheries 
Service), or the “listing agencies.”  The word “commercial” is often misleading to students of the 
statute: it does not refer to economic criteria, which were expressly excluded by Congress in 1982, 
but rather to trade data that might shed light on threats to a candidate species.  See supra note 8 
and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Sinden, supra note 6, at 1491 n.371.  Further regulations 
have made clear that scientific or commercial publications, administrative reports, maps or other 
graphic materials, expert analyses or testimony, and interested party comments may be reviewed 
in listing decisions, but the use of economic impact data are specifically excluded from the defini-
tion of best scientific and commercial data.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE 
PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK 22 (2d ed. 2010).  For a description of the listing 
process, see infra Part I.   
 10.  By “efficient extinction,” I refer to the notion that causing or tolerating the extinction of a 
particular species might appear to be economically efficient, at least if one uses certain discount-
ing rates and adopts a high tolerance for certain types of risk.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 
61 (“Even with proper regulations, a commercially valuable species may become extinct, at least 
if narrowly economic criteria are applied and catastrophic risk ignored.”).  As Judge Posner points 
out, the extinction of even commercially valuable species may appear to be efficient in certain 
situations.  Id. (“The reason this can happen (‘efficient extinction’) is that the rate at which a spe-
cies reproduces may be lower than the market discount rate.” (emphasis added)).  The ESA’s list-
ing process, which eschews any consideration of economic incentives or the use of cost-benefit 
analysis, leaves no room for federal listing agencies to acquiesce in an ongoing process of effi-
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Naturally, decades of practice have compromised the ostensible abso-
lutism of the listing process to some degree, allowing some economic con-
siderations to creep in and influence listing decisions.11  Nevertheless, de-
spite the inevitable compromises wrought by four decades of practice, most 
scholars, courts, and bureaucrats agree that the listing process has, for better 
or worse, largely proved to be an idiosyncratic survivor of the past decades’ 
wider cost-benefit turn.12  Of course, the ESA’s defenders and critics vio-
                                                          
cient extinction—a position that some critics of the listing process believe may be mistaken.  Id. 
(“We must not take for granted that the extinction of species that have no commercial value, or 
less value than the cost of averting their extinction, is a social problem, let alone one that poses a 
catastrophic risk to human welfare.”).   
 11.  See, e.g., Jamison E. Colburn, Permits, Property, and Planning in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Habitat as Survival and Beyond, in REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM 84 (Jonathan H. Adler, ed. 2011) (noting that both cost-
conscious governance and a series of legislative amendments “combined to remake the ESA’s 
simple, forceful declaration of principle”).  Many scholars who disagree about the merits of incor-
porating economic considerations into decisions about biodiversity and extinction agree that the 
formal statutory exclusion of economic considerations from the listing process has been somewhat 
qualified in practice.  Compare MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 94 (2006) (claiming that “the absolutism of the Endangered Species 
Act . . . has in practice been qualified”), with Sinden, supra note 6, at 1493 (noting that like almost 
every other legal standard, the ESA “leaves some zone of discretion—some ‘wiggle room’” that 
allows for negotiation in which “economic interests play a significant role”).  For a more exten-
sive discussion of the historical relationship between economic considerations, the ESA generally, 
and the listing process specifically, see infra Parts I and II.   
 12.  See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT 
L. FISCHMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 288 (6th ed. 2007) (“Does [16 
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A)] foreclose the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service from considering the econom-
ic hardship that might result from listing a species?  A long string of cases have concluded yes.”); 
DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1098, 1130 (2d 
ed. 2010) (noting that listing determinations must “be made ‘solely on the basis of the best scien-
tific and commercial data available,’” and that “economics [are] not to be considered”); SHANNON 
C. PETERSEN, ACTING FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE STATUTORY ARK ix (2002) (referring to 
the ESA as being among the strongest of American environmental laws and noting that “[m]ost 
important[ly], Section 4 prohibits any consideration of economic factors” from listing decisions); 
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN, & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND 
POLICY 350 (2d ed. 2009) (“Importantly, the agency may not consider economic costs or benefits 
in its listing decision.  Only scientific data . . . may enter into the decision.”); J. Baird Callicott, 
Explicit and Implicit Values, in 2 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: CONSERVING 
BIODIVERSITY IN HUMAN DOMINATED LANDSCAPES 39 (J. Michael Scott, Dale D. Goble & 
Frank W. Davis, eds., 2006) (suggesting that the ESA “implicitly recognizes the intrinsic value of 
listed species, effectively exempting their conservation from purely instrumental—and thus purely 
economic—considerations”); Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 1393, 1396, 1418 (1981) (noting that the ESA “flout[s] [the] [concept] of economic effi-
ciency” and claiming that “the point of the [ESA]” is that it “is not cost-beneficial”); Amy Sinden, 
The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical 
Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004) (noting that “the ESA . . . is 
held up in environmental courses across the nation as the paradigmatic ‘absolutist’ statute—a tree 
hugger’s dream” because “[w]ith a few minor exceptions, its prohibitions are unequivocal, based 
purely on biological science, unqualified by economic considerations”); LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, 
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lently disagree about the merits of the listing process, particularly its aver-
sion to cost-benefit analysis and broader economic considerations.13  There 
is widespread agreement, however, that the ESA’s listing process has tend-
ed to resist the encroachment of the cost-benefit turn that has transformed 
many other areas of environmental and natural resource legislation and reg-
ulation: for good or ill, the listing process is held out as a hardy survivor of 
the wider cost-benefit turn.14 
This Article suggests that recent attempts to tinker at the margins of 
the listing process—small-scale efforts that have attracted far less attention 
than past frontal assaults on the listing process—collectively pose a novel 
challenge to the long-standing exclusion of economic considerations from 
the listing process.15  In recent months, legislators from a variety of states 
have introduced a number of bills either to delist species recognized as en-
dangered under the Act or to exempt specific species from listing considera-
tion altogether.16  Most of this legislation does not seek to amend the ESA 
for all species or to rewrite its generally applicable substantive terms.  In-
stead, these small-scale, ostensibly limited efforts tend to provide only that 
a specific species, such as the gray wolf, should be delisted, or that the Act 
should not apply at all to a particular candidate for listing, such as the dunes 
sagebrush lizard, lesser prairie-chicken, or the Atlantic bluefin tuna.17 
A close examination of these recent efforts reveals a shared purpose: 
namely, the desire to prevent the perceived local and regional economic 
costs listing might impose—costs that, of course, the listing process is de-
                                                          
supra note 9, at 13 (“In determining whether to list a species, the responsible agency is required to 
consider . . . biological risks” but not “economic impact”).  
 13.  Compare SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 48 (discussing the ESA listing program and conclud-
ing “I applaud the Endangered Species Act, although I have no earthly use for the Colorado 
squawfish or the Indiana bat”), with James L. Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, 13 
PUB. LAND L. REV. 51, 52, 75–76 (1992) (claiming that “[w]hatever Congress was thinking in the 
enactment of the Endangered Species Act, they inadvertently produced as nonanthropocentric a 
statute as is possible,” and concluding that any statutory or regulatory scheme based on such 
“[b]iocentric rights claims” must “fail because [it] must be asserted by humans and enforced by 
humans”).  
 14.  Compare POSNER, supra note 2, at 185 (claiming that the ESA’s exclusion of cost-benefit 
analysis from the listing process is “[t]he place not to start” in devising sensible solutions to the 
problem of biodiversity loss (emphasis added)), with Sinden, supra note 6, at 1488 (claiming that 
the ESA provides a rare and prominent example of a “trumping approach” in which environmen-
tal-protection interests “override considerations of economic cost,” which unfortunately tends to 
be “ghettoize[d] . . . as a special case”). 
 15.  See infra Parts II and III. 
 16.  See, e.g., S.A. 397, 112th Cong. (2011) (not enacted) (“Section 4 of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1533) is amended by adding at the end the following . . . ‘[t]his Act 
shall not apply to the sand dune lizard.’”); S.A. 429, 112th Cong. (2011) (not enacted) (“Section 4 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1533) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing . . . ‘[t]his Act shall not apply to the lesser prairie chicken.’”).   
 17.  See infra Part III. 
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signed to exclude, at least as it is conventionally understood.18  Moreover, 
while this recent burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legisla-
tion has attracted a measure of attention and opposition,19 to date it has not 
faced anything like the popular and legislative backlash created by past ef-
forts to incorporate economic considerations into the listing process.20  In-
deed, as this Article will show, some examples of this species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation have proven to be quite effective at fo-
cusing and concentrating public opposition to listings and potential listings.  
Thus, this sort of legislation affords critics of the ESA multiple avenues for 
success. 
If, for example, the legislation is enacted and a species such as the gray 
wolf is delisted or exempted, then critics of the ESA have won an obvious 
victory.  Even if such legislation is not enacted, however, the prospect of its 
passage and its instrumental utility in amplifying and focusing local opposi-
tion to a listing may generate decisive pressure on listing agencies and on 
environmental groups, which in turn may compel the listing agencies to de-
lay or abandon a listing, as was the case with the dunes sagebrush lizard.21  
Accordingly, this recent trend threatens to rewrite the standard picture of 
the ESA, leaving behind a process so riddled by legislative species-specific 
exemptions and delistings that, at least in some instances, it effectively de-
parts from the traditional exclusion of economic factors, amounting to what 
I will refer to as ‘efficient’ listing and delisting.22 
                                                          
 18.  See supra notes 7–9, 12–14. 
 19.  Lenny Bernstein, Gray Wolf to Lose Endangered Species Protection as Numbers Rise, 
WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-
07/national/39807988_1_species-protections-gray-wolves-gray-wolf; James R. Koren, Baca 
Wants Flies off Endangered List, REDLANDS DAILY FACTS (Mar. 18, 2011, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.redlandsdailyfacts.com/general-news/20110319/baca-wants-flies-off-endangered-list.  
For a more detailed discussion of the criticism of and opposition to these recent efforts, see infra 
Part III. 
 20.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 21.  See infra Part III. 
 22.  My use of single quotation marks around ‘efficient’ here and in the Article’s title is de-
liberate.  For the reasons set forth in Part IV, infra, I argue that the recent legislation fails to ac-
count for the full costs and benefits of protecting or failing to protect the specific species at issue. 
In pointing out that this recent legislation focuses solely (and imprecisely) on a one-sided 
picture of the costs and benefits related to listing decisions, I do not mean to imply that more bal-
anced efficiency analyses might provide an appropriate standard to make decisions about listing 
endangered or threatened species.  Rather, my use of these marks is intended only to suggest that 
even if one believes efficiency is an appropriate standard for either listing and delisting decisions, 
or for more fundamental decisions about the survival or extinction of a species, then the account-
ing of the relevant costs and benefits in the recent legislative activity is so one-sided and circum-
scribed as to make this activity unsupportable for the reasons discussed briefly in this note and at 
length below in the text.  See infra Part IV.  Of course, the arguments I advance against the recent 
‘efficient’ (de)listing are all the stronger if one believes that economic considerations are inappro-
priate for either listing and delisting decisions or for more fundamental decisions about the surviv-
al or extinction of a species.  
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The remainder of this Article will discuss and evaluate this recent and 
largely hidden rise of ‘efficient’ (de)listing legislation, as well as the poten-
tial sea change it represents to the standard picture of the listing process, the 
“keystone” of the ESA.23  Part I reviews the structure of the listing process 
and the ways in which it formally excludes economic considerations.  Part 
II discusses the evolution of the ESA, the history of challenges to its exclu-
sion of economic considerations, and its continued outlier status amid the 
larger cost-benefit turn.  Part III of the Article explores the recent legislative 
efforts to delist or exempt specific species from the ESA, all based largely 
on concerns about the local or regional economic impact of the listings.  
Part IV explains why these under-examined, widely dispersed legislative 
efforts are likely to continue, and why they represent such a substantial 
change to the listing process.  In the conclusion of this Article, I begin to 
examine what responses, if any, might be appropriate in the face of this 
hidden rise of ‘efficient’ (de)listing, if its present pace continues or acceler-
ates. 
I.  THE LISTING PROCESS AND ITS FORMAL EXCLUSION OF ECONOMIC 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Because it is “short, compact, and . . . has a hell of a set of teeth,” the 
ESA is occasionally referred to as the “pit bull” of environmental and natu-
ral resources law.24  Despite this label, many have argued that the statute’s 
substantive bite has been somewhat compromised in recent decades.25  
Nevertheless, critics and defenders of the ESA still tend to agree that the 
formal structure and substantive protections remain one of the strongest ar-
ticulations of preservationist principles in the law.26  More than almost any 
                                                          
In short, I argue here that one ought to reject the recent trend toward ‘efficient’ (de)listing 
regardless of one’s views about “efficient extinction.”  Cf. supra note 10.  
 23.  See infra Parts I–IV. 
 24.  The “pit bull” phrase may have been coined by Donald Barry while he was vice-president 
of the World Wildlife Fund.  See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environmental Law May 
Become Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/26/us/strongest-us-environment-law-may-become-endangered-
species.html. 
 25.  See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. 
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 279 (1993) (“Over the years, 
the Departments of Interior and Commerce, have converted [the ESA’s] specific stages and clear 
commands into an act of discretion,” which “has accommodated the overwhelming majority of 
human activity without impediment”); ADLER & POSNER, supra note 11, at 94 (“Similarly, the 
absolutism of the Endangered Species Act, which on the face of it ‘commands that species be pro-
tected whatever the cost and admits of no exception,’ has in practice been qualified.”).   
 26.  See, e.g., CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES 25 (1995) (suggesting that “the Noah Principle,” the notion that “[o]n 
moral, ethical, and spiritual grounds, we must preserve biodiversity above all else . . . has been 
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other statute, the ESA compels the preservation of environmental resources, 
even at the potential expense of individual property rights or overall effi-
ciency.27 
For these reasons, critics and defenders of the ESA often invoke an-
other metaphor, one more useful for this Article because it does a better job 
illuminating the fundamental norms behind the ESA and highlighting the 
central importance of the listing process to the larger statute.  The metaphor 
I have in mind is the comparison of the ESA to an ark,28 which captures the 
inclusive notion at the heart of the biblical Noah narrative, wherein repre-
sentatives of every species should be eligible for protection and continued 
survival regardless of their situation or their instrumental value to humani-
ty.29  Thus the ESA’s fundamental values are often said to invoke the “No-
ah principle”: the notion that “long-standing existence in Nature is deemed 
to carry with it the unimpeachable right to continued existence.”30  Part I 
explains how the listing process has traditionally been understood as per-
haps the clearest expression of these fundamental principles within the 
Act’s larger statutory framework,31 focusing in particular on the listing pro-
cess’s long-standing exclusion of economic considerations. 
                                                          
adopted, largely intact, in the Endangered Species Act”); see also supra notes 6–14 and accompa-
nying text.  
 27.  Sagoff, supra note 12, at 1396. 
 28.  See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Dis-
course, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 51–54, 70–72 (2000) (examining the relationship of the No-
ah narrative with contemporary environmental and natural resource issues); see also generally 
JONATHAN H. ADLER, ET AL., REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT REFORM (2011); Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of 
Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991); PETERSEN, supra note 12.  
 29.  See GENESIS 6:19–20 (Douay-Rheims) (“And of every living creature . . . thou shalt 
bring two of a sort into the ark, that they may live . . . [o]f fowls according to their kind, and of 
beasts in their kind, and of every thing that creepeth on the earth according to its kind; two of eve-
ry sort shall go in with thee, that they may live.”). 
 30.  DAVID EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 208 (1978).  Ehrenfeld argues that 
the Noah Principle is justified by values that transcend economic considerations, broader utilitari-
an arguments, and even anthropocentric ethical systems.  See id. at 210 (arguing that “it is as dis-
honest and unwise to trump up weak resource values” for the protection of a species “as it is un-
necessary to abandon the effort to conserve it,” because “[i]ts non-humanistic value is enough to 
justify its protection”); see also John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 
1216–60 (1998) (discussing the Noah Principle and the ways in which the ESA has been com-
pared to the story of Noah in Genesis).  
 31.  See, e.g., Colburn, supra note 11, at 84 (arguing that after decades of changes to the ESA, 
the listing process “is the only juncture where the relative costs and benefits of regulatory action 
remain categorically excluded from consideration in administering the ESA”).   
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A.  The Listing Process and the Listing Agencies 
Two federal agencies, the FWS and the NMFS, are tasked with admin-
istering the listing process pursuant to Section 4 of the ESA.32  To become 
eligible for the substantive protections that the ESA provides, a candidate 
species must be designated as either “endangered” or “threatened” by a list-
ing agency; the terms are defined by the relative peril of extinction that a 
given species faces.33  Because none of the statute’s substantive protections 
apply until a species has passed through the gateway of the listing process, 
Congress has described the listing process as the “keystone” that holds the 
rest of the Act together.34 
Any species may become a candidate for listing either by a listing 
agency’s own action or by an individual citizen petition.35  If the process is 
                                                          
 32.  See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2012) (noting that “[t]he U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) share responsibilities for administering 
the [ESA]”).  Section 4 of the ESA refers to 16 U.S.C. § 1533, (2006), first discussed at note 9, 
supra.  The regulations for revising the lists of endangered and threatened species are found at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 424 (2012).  In practice, most listing issues involve FWS rather than NMFS.  E.g., Ben 
Jesup, Endless War or End this War? The History of Litigation Under Section 4 of the Endan-
gered Species Act and the Multi-District Litigation Settlements, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 330 n.5 
(2013).   
 33.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2006) (“The term ‘endangered species’ means any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a 
species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection un-
der the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.”); 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2006) (“The term ‘threatened species’ means any species which is likely to 
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion 
of its range.”).   
Obviously, as many commentators have noted, the “pest” exception set forth in 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(6) (2006) constitutes a slight but inherent exception to the generally absolutist and biocen-
tric norms expressed in the ESA’s statutory framework.  See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 30, at 1193 
(noting the pest exception amid other minor exceptions to the “common image of the ESA . . . that 
[] prohibits any choices among species”).  It will not be discussed further in this Article. 
 34.  See H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2810 (ex-
plaining “[t]he protective measures to counter species extinction take effect when a species is 
listed,” and then claiming that “[t]he listing process under Section 4 is the keystone of the 
[ESA]”); see also J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, in 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 19, 19 (noting 
that “Congress, when reauthorizing the ESA in 1982, confirmed that these procedures are nothing 
less than the keystone of the nation’s first meaningful species protection law”).   
 35.  See 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (2012) (“Any interested person may submit a written petition . . . 
requesting that one of the actions described in § 424.10 be taken [including that a species be listed 
or deleted from the lists].”).  Once the listing agency receives a written petition requesting that a 
species be limited, it must make a preliminary determination called the “90-day finding,” which 
must be published in the Federal Register.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2006).  If, in this 90-day 
finding, the listing agency concludes that the petition presents “substantial information” in support 
of listing, the process continues; if not, the process concludes without listing. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 
(2012); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); Jesup, supra note 32, at 335.  The listing agencies 
also have the authority to initiate the process for any species they believe to be either threatened or 
endangered even without a petition.  Such species may be immediately proposed for listing or 
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initiated by an outside petition, then after the initial review process, the list-
ing agency must make a determination about the status of that species.  This 
determination can end in one of three ways.36  First, the listing agency may 
determine that a candidate species should be listed as either endangered or 
threatened and therefore eligible for the substantive protections afforded by 
the statute.37  Second, the listing agency may determine that the species 
does not deserve to be listed.38  Third, the listing agency may determine that 
the listing of the species is “warranted but precluded” because of the back-
log of pending proposals to list other species.39  Crucially, although eco-
nomic considerations and cost-benefit analysis may, or even must, be in-
corporated into some decisions about the substantive protections of the ESA 
after a species has been listed,40 such considerations are formally omitted 
from the listing process itself.41  In general, the procedures described here 
regarding listing generally apply to administrative delisting—
determinations by a listing agency that a listed species no longer warrants 
protection.42  The delisting and exemption legislation discussed in this Arti-
                                                          
added to the “candidate species” list, which organizes species in a “listing priority system” based 
on the threats that various species face and their taxonomic uniqueness.  Endangered and Threat-
ened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,098-99 (Sept. 21, 
1983).   
For a more recent description of the petition and candidate-assessment processes, see, for ex-
ample, Jesup, supra note 32, at 335–36. 
 36.  This status review must end in one of three determinations within twelve months of the 
listing agency’s receipt of the petition.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) (2006).   
 37.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).   
 38.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006).   
 39.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).  Species listed as “warranted but precluded” are 
assigned priority numbers and added to the candidate list discussed supra in note 35.  The listing 
agencies have faced a considerable backlog of species since the earliest days of the ESA’s opera-
tion, caused by extensive early candidate lists, subsequent warranted-but-precluded findings, and 
budgetary constraints.  See, e.g., Jesup, supra note 32, at 341 (“Almost since the inception of the 
[ESA], FWS has faced a backlog of listing actions . . . [and its] budget for the listing program has 
never been sufficient to address the entire backlog.”).  This backlog will be discussed further infra 
in Part II, in connection with the use of funding cuts as a method of opposition to the ESA gener-
ally and the listing process more specifically.  
 40.  See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, The Exemption Process and the “God Squad,” in 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 131, 132–33 
(discussing the origination of the Endangered Species Committee, which “reflects the tension be-
tween the oft-competing goals of species conservation and economic development”); Kalyani 
Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and Reviving Critical Habitat Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1095, 1108 (2010) (“Although the ESA forbids 
consideration of economic impact during the listing process, it expressly includes it for designat-
ing critical habitat.”).   
 41.  See, e.g., Colburn, supra note 11, at 84 (noting that while economic considerations are 
“categorically excluded” from the listing process, the ESA “is either silent . . . or it expressly in-
cludes cost, feasibility, practicability, and other like considerations” for “virtually every other reg-
ulatory action carried out pursuant to the Act”).  
 42.  E.g., Jesup, supra note 32, at 334 n.41.   
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cle short-circuits these standard administrative procedures, replacing them 
instead with whatever congressional deliberation may accompany such leg-
islation. 
B.  The Early History of the Listing Process 
Congress passed the ESA amid a surge of concern about the potential 
extinction of iconic American species such as the bald eagle and near the 
end of an even broader surge of public environmental consciousness that 
provided the impetus for similarly wide-ranging and transformative statutes 
such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National Environ-
mental Protection Act.43  As a result, although the ESA represented a dra-
matic change from previously haphazard attempts to address extinction and 
biodiversity issues,44 it was passed with relatively little scrutiny and over-
whelming support.45  Thus, it has memorably been described as “one of the 
last pieces of environmental bandwagon legislation” from the late 1960s 
and 1970s.46  Perhaps due to this bandwagon effect, legislative ignorance 
about the ramifications of the statute appears to have been particularly pro-
nounced: in the words of a Deputy Secretary of the Interior in 1973, “there 
were probably not more than four of us who understood [the ESA’s] ramifi-
cations.”47 
Moreover, during the legislative debates about the ESA as well as the 
early years of its implementation, many listing candidates were charismatic 
megafauna similar to the species whose plight had led to the bill’s pas-
sage.48  Early listed species already had substantial pre-existing popular ap-
                                                          
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (2006). 
 44.  See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
175, 176 (2010) (“Although the ESA was by no means the first national conservation law, it 
marked a distinct change from past federal conservation efforts in a number of important re-
spects.”).   
 45.  STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT 55–56 (1982).  The ESA was initially passed unanimously in the Senate by a vote of 
92–0, and a slightly more protective version was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote 
of 390–12.  Following revisions in conference to resolve the differences between the two houses, a 
revised version was passed without dissent in the Senate by a voice vote and in the House by a 
vote of 355–4.  Id.   
 46.  Id. at 48; see also J. Michael Scott et al., 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, 
supra note 12, at 7 (“The [ESA] was among the least controversial bills enacted by Congress in 
1973 . . . .”). 
 47.  CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES 160 (1995) (quoting Deputy Secretary of the Interior Curtis Bohlen); see 
also Doremus, supra note 44, at 178 (“[I]t is widely believed that most legislators were not aware 
of the full scope of the ESA’s coverage when they voted for it.”).   
 48.  See Doremus, supra note 44, at 177 (noting that the legislative debates over the ESA 
“centered on charismatic species like grizzly bears, bald eagles, and timber wolves”); Nagle, su-
pra note 30, at 1202 n.122 (“The Congress that enacted the ESA in 1973 was thinking primarily 
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peal and support for measures to ensure their continued survival, even if 
their continued survival entailed substantial economic cost.49  This meant 
that the decisions reached by the listing agencies when considering such 
easily identifiable, well-known initial candidate species were rarely contro-
versial.  It was also easy to dismiss the potentially wide-ranging costs of fu-
ture listings: for example, one sponsor of the Senate version of the ESA 
acknowledged that “[m]ost animals are worth very little in terms of dollars 
and cents,” yet still lauded the ESA’s potential effects because the aesthetic 
value of the species discussed was seen to be “great indeed,” even “un-
measurable.”50  As a result, there was very little public controversy about 
the listing process in the years during the ESA’s passage and in the years 
immediately afterwards.51  Thus, the potential ramifications of the ESA 
were poorly understood and largely escaped debate;52 and the Act was 
passed with overwhelming legislative and popular support.53 
Today, such widespread consensus and broad support for the ESA are 
only dim memories.54  In the decades after its passage, repeated controversy 
                                                          
(if not exclusively) of the most charismatic species” such as “whales, leopards, alligators, whoop-
ing cranes, wolves, falcons, cougars, the California condor, [and] the bald eagle.”).   
 49.  See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law 
Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 822 (1986) (noting that around 
the ESA’s passage “[e]ndangered species had the good fortune to be represented by [] mediagenic 
figures . . . sentimentally appealing, fairly remote from market considerations affecting most peo-
ple, and dramatic or beautiful”); Jonathan H. Adler, The Leaky Ark: The Failure of Endangered 
Species Regulation on Private Land, in REBUILDING THE ARK, supra note 11, at 6, 20 (noting that 
“[s]pecies that were more ‘charismatic’—that is more ‘warm and fuzzy’ or politically popular—
were more likely to be listed” immediately after the ESA was passed). 
 50.  119 CONG. REC. 25,675 (1973) (statement of Sen. Williams).  At the signing ceremony 
for the ESA, President Nixon declared that “[n]othing is more priceless and more worthy of 
preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our country has been blessed.”  Presi-
dent Nixon’s Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 374 PUB. PAPERS 1027, 
1027–28 (Dec. 28, 1973).   
 51.  See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 44, at 177 (“Despite the[] sweeping changes” that the 
ESA represented compared to past federal wildlife conservation efforts, the “enactment of the 
ESA was a surprisingly placid affair.”).   
 52.  James L. Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 51, 51 
(1992) (claiming that “Congress enacted the [ESA] without really understanding what it was do-
ing . . . envision[ing] the protection of bald eagles and grizzly bears, not desert pupfish and Ore-
gon silverspot butterflies”).   
 53.  STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 21 (2001) (noting that 
“[f]or several years” after passage of the ESA, “the ESA enjoyed almost unqualified support”); 
see also PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 42 (“The continued popularity of the ESA during the mid-
1970s can be attributed not just to the lack of controversy surrounding it but also to growing con-
cern over the extinction crisis.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme 
Court, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 490 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s ESA jurispru-
dence over decades of conflict arising out of the statute, and arguing that the ESA “no longer en-
joys [the] special status in the Court” that it once held after Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill); 
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has transformed the ESA from the last piece of environmentally conscious 
bandwagon legislation into the most controversial piece of natural resource 
and environmental legislation on the books.55  How and when did the ESA 
become such a lightning rod?  The answer, as will be seen in more detail in 
Part II, is largely tied to growing public awareness of, and dissatisfaction 
with, the apparent economic costs of biodiversity protection—especially 
with its apparent local and regional costs. 
II.  PAST CHALLENGES TO THE LISTING PROCESS 
Part II does not purport to provide a general history of the ESA, but ra-
ther explores how the ESA evolved in the face of a growing awareness of 
the economic costs of biodiversity protection, focusing on the listing pro-
cess.56  A few brief notes regarding the overall history of the ESA are ap-
propriate at the outset, however.  Despite increasing opposition to the ESA 
and its exclusion of economic considerations, legislative amendments to the 
Act’s substantive provisions, while somewhat common in the law’s early 
years, have been nonexistent since the 1980s.  Indeed, the statute itself has 
only really been subjected to significant amendments at three points since 
1973: in the late 1970s, in the early 1980s, and in the late 1980s.57 
Moreover, while these decades-old formal legislative amendments in-
troduced some measure of accommodation with economic and political 
considerations into the ESA’s formally absolutist values,58 they did little to 
                                                          
Nagle, supra note 30, at 1173 (“Once viewed as too popular to criticize, the ESA has become the 
focal point of intense controversy.”).  
 55.  See, e.g., JOE ROMAN, LISTED: DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA’S ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT 3 (2011) (“Even more than other environmental achievements of the 1970s . . . the [ESA] 
draws anger: It doesn’t work.  It costs too much.  It puts people out of work.  It puts animals be-
fore humans.”); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better 
Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1031–32 & n.2. (1997) (describing 
the protests, demonstrations, extreme rhetoric, and violence that have accompanied conflict over 
the ESA).   
 56.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 57.  See, e.g., STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 22–26 (discussing the 1978, 
1982, and 1988 amendments in detail); Colburn, supra note 11, at 84 (arguing that “[s]ignificant 
amendments in 1978, 1979, 1982, and 1988 all combined to remake the ESA’s simple, forceful 
declaration of principle into a labyrinthine framework”).  For its part, FWS’s own brief history 
notes that “Congress enacted significant amendments in 1978, 1982, and 1988, while keeping the 
overall framework of the 1973 Act essentially unchanged.”  UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, A HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 (2011), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/history_ESA.pdf.  FWS then notes that the Act 
underwent another amendment in 2004, which exempts the Department of Defense from critical 
habitat designation so long as an integrated natural resources management plan is prepared.  Id. 
(citing Pub. L. No. 108-136 (2004)).  This minor 2004 amendment will not be discussed at any 
greater length in this Article.   
 58.  See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Lessons Learned, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT 
THIRTY, supra note 12, at 195, 198 (suggesting that “[t]he two most important amendments,” in 
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alter the core principles expressed by the statute.59  More specifically, none 
of these amendments eroded the formal exclusion of economic considera-
tions from the listing process in any lasting way.  Indeed, the 1982 amend-
ments reinforced the listing process’s rejection of economic considerations: 
Congress “specifically reject[ed]” such considerations as having “no rele-
vance to determinations regarding the status of species.”60  Since the 1982 
amendments, Congress has not formally amended the ESA’s listing provi-
sions in any significant way;61 and thus the statutory expression of these ab-
solutist norms in the listing process has proven to be particularly resistant to 
legislative revision, at least until very recently.62 
                                                          
1978 and in 1982, may have “introduced some measure of pragmatism into what began as a per-
haps unrealistically starry-eyed law”). 
 59.  See id. (“But the core assumptions underlying the ESA have remained the same since 
1973: all species have great value; none should be extinguished by human action without the ut-
most consideration and strong justification.”).   
 60.  H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2820.  The 
1982 amendments strengthened the listing process and emphasized its rejection of economic con-
siderations in other less obvious but perhaps even more practical ways as well, by allowing list-
ings to proceed even if critical habitat designations were to be delayed, and by speeding up the 
listing process through the introduction of a 90-day preliminary finding.  See, e.g., STANFORD 
ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 24 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(6)(C), 1533(b)(3)(A) (2006)).  
Even while the 1982 amendments strengthened the listing process’s exclusion of economic 
considerations, they weakened the absolutist norms of other provisions of the ESA by allowing 
private parties to “take” listed species in certain circumstances, provided that doing so would not 
jeopardize the species’ chances for survival.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (permitting “any tak-
ing otherwise prohibited . . . if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out 
of an otherwise lawful activity”); see also Doremus, supra note 58, at 198 (referring to this as one 
of the two significant measures “introduc[ing] some . . . pragmatism” into the ESA’s framework).  
For useful background and discussion of this amendment, see, for example, LIEBESMAN & 
PETERSEN, supra note 9, at 73–75.   
The lesson here is not that the 1982 amendment permitting incidental takes fundamentally 
compromised the absolutist norms of the ESA generally.  See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 58, at 
198 (noting that “the core assumptions” of the ESA “have remained constant” despite these and 
other amendments).  Rather, the lesson is that these absolutist norms have tended to find their pur-
est expression in the listing process—though this lesson may now be subject to revision as a result 
of the recent legislation discussed in Parts III and IV, infra.   
 61.  See ADLER ET AL., supra note 28, at 2 (noting that “Congress has not revised the [ESA] 
in over twenty-five years,” because of “partisan infighting and interest group pressure”); Dore-
mus, supra note 58, at 198 (arguing that “the ESA has been impervious to fundamental revision 
and remains relatively untouched by legislative exemptions and stealth amendments”).   
 62.  See supra notes 6–11, 13–14, 28, 34, 40–41; see also infra notes 80, 100–104, 112–114 
and accompanying text. 
Of course, federal legislators continue attempts to overhaul the general provisions of the list-
ing process, even though such attempts have, to date, largely proven fruitless.  A particularly re-
cent example is provided by Senate Bill 1731, introduced in November 2013 by Senators Rand 
Paul, Mike Lee, and Dean Heller, which would, inter alia, require that all species be delisted eve-
ry five years in the absence of joint congressional legislation to the contrary, as well as require 
listing agencies to provide detailed accounts of the costs of protecting listed species.  I argue here 
that the recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation has and likely will continue to 
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Although the statutory text of the ESA has proven to be unusually re-
sistant to legislative amendment, both the Act in general and the listing pro-
cess specifically have been subjected to substantial changes imposed 
through executive action, which some have argued amount to a de facto 
“administrative amendment” of the statute.63  In addition, congressionally 
imposed funding cuts, a temporary moratorium on listings, repeated failed 
legislative amendments, and long-running litigation over potential listings 
have impacted the absolutist norms of the ESA generally and the listing 
process specifically, thereby creating room for agency discretion, negotia-
tion with interested parties, and the consideration of economic and political 
considerations not contemplated by the statute’s formal norms.64 
As the remainder of Part II will show, despite some practical accom-
modations with economic considerations, the ESA remains a remarkably 
distinct outlier amid the cost-benefit turn.65  In short, although decades of 
practice have afforded some “wiggle room” for agency discretion, the im-
pact of economic and political considerations within this room for discre-
tion remains somewhat limited by the absolute statutory standards that act 
as “trumps” that limit the influence of economic considerations and shift 
power to environmental-protection interests.66  This limitation is especially 
significant with respect to the listing process, which, at least until recently, 
has continued to remain an outlier amid the cost-benefit wave of recent dec-
ades.67  To appreciate the significance of the recent delisting and exemption 
                                                          
be more significant than such direct attempts to re-write the listing provisions of the ESA, but ob-
viously the passage of this or other similar legislation would undermine this argument.   
 63.  See infra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.   
 64.  See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, Strength in Numbers: Setting Quantitative Criteria for Listing 
Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 10–12, 18–20 
(2009) (arguing that the listing process is “somewhat broken” because of ambiguous practical di-
rectives in the ESA itself and the listing agencies implementing regulations); Houck, supra note 
25, at 279, 281, 286 (arguing that the backlog of species and FWS’s use of the “warranted but pre-
cluded category” have converted the ESA’s “clear commands” into “act[s] of discretion” for the 
listing agencies).  
 65.  See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 58, at 196 (noting that “most of the serious criticism [of 
the ESA] is strikingly muted, focused on the details of implementation,” and pointing out that “[i]t 
is not disputed that the ESA has done far more to protect America’s biota than any other law”).   
 66.  Sinden, supra note 6, at 1411–13, 1493–94, 1500–08. 
 67.  See, e.g., Colburn, supra note 11 (arguing that after decades of changes to the ESA, the 
listing process “is the only juncture where the relative costs and benefits of regulatory action re-
main categorically excluded from consideration in administering the ESA”).  The particular im-
portance of keeping the listing process free from economic considerations was highlighted by an 
open letter from over a thousand scientists to the Senate in which the scientists acknowledged that 
“[w]hile non-scientific factors may appropriately be considered at points later in the process, their 
use in listing decisions is inconsistent with the biologically defensible principles of the Endan-
gered Species Act.”  See infra note 220.  Indeed, even when commentators point out the ways in 
which the formally absolute values of the listing process have been compromised in practice, they 
tend to acknowledge that these compromises are less significant than those afforded under other 
sections of the ESA.  See, e.g., Houck, supra note 25, at 281 (noting that “Congress has provided 
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legislation, it is necessary to understand both its roots in the serial attempts 
over the past decades to incorporate political and economic considerations 
into the listing process, as well as its potential impact upon the fundamental 
statutory norms of the listing process that weigh against compromise with 
these political and economic factors. 
A.  Early Conflicts and Escape Valves 
As most students of environmental and natural resources law know, 
public awareness of and anger over the economic impact of the ESA’s pro-
tections erupted with the snail darter litigation in the late 1970s.68  The en-
dangered snail darter, a species of perch discovered shortly before the pas-
sage of the ESA, was thought to live exclusively in a single portion of the 
Little Tennessee River, a habitat that would be destroyed by completion of 
the Tellico Dam.69  On behalf of the snail darter, environmental and com-
munity activists sued pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA to enjoin completion 
of the dam, a project that was halfway completed before the ESA was en-
acted.70  Termination of the dam project, therefore, would result in non-
recoverable losses amounting to tens of millions of dollars in order to pro-
tect a previously unknown species of fish.71  To the surprise of many,72 the 
Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill73 chose the fish, finding that 
                                                          
loopholes, qualifiers, and escape valves for nearly every succeeding provision of the Act . . . 
[r]ecognizing, however, that an unlisted species receives no conscious decision on its survival, the 
legislative requirement for listing remains simple and unexceptional: the decision need only be 
scientifically sound”). 
 68.  Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  The collision between the Tellico Dam 
and the snail darter at the heart of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill was not the first case to re-
veal the substantial costs potentially posed by implementation of the ESA, but it was by far the 
most significant in the years immediately after the ESA was passed.  See Sinden, supra note 12, at 
144 (reviewing other early controversies and concluding that “[t]he most notorious controversy 
spawned by the newly enacted statute involved the . . . Tellico Dam project . . . [and] the snail 
darter”).   
 69.  See Hill, 437 U.S at 171 (“We begin with the premise that operation of the Tellico Dam 
will either eradicate the known population of snail darters or destroy their critical habitat.”).   
 70.  Id. at 165–66 (explaining that environmental and community activists sought to enjoin 
completion of the dam and impoundment of the reservoir on the grounds that those actions would 
violate the Act by causing the extinction of the snail darter, even though the Tellico Dam was 
about 80% complete).   
 71.  Id. at 166 (“The District Court also found that if the Tellico Project was permanently en-
joined, ‘[s]ome $53 million would be lost in nonrecoverable obligations,’ meaning that a large 
portion of the $78 million already expended would be wasted.”).   
 72.  Cf. Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative 
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 479 (1999) (explaining that Congress 
urged passage of the ESA to protect megafauna, such as whales, spotted cats, eastern timber 
wolves, eastern cougars, or wolverines, not mollusks, anthropods, or other small plant and animal 
species). 
 73.  437 U.S. 153 (1978).   
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“[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and reverse 
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”74 
Hill prompted the first widespread backlash against the ESA, with last-
ing effects that continue to reverberate today.75  In Hill’s wake, legislators 
expressed shock and fury at the deliberate exclusion of cost considerations 
from the Court’s decision and the perceived absurdity of protecting the snail 
darter at the expense of such a costly project.76  Many legislators and com-
mentators predicted that Congress would either repeal or revise the statute 
wholesale after Hill.77  Indeed, Congress considered several wide-ranging 
proposals to incorporate economic considerations into the ESA in the years 
after Hill was decided.78  Despite this popular and legislative uproar, the ac-
tual reforms enacted immediately after Hill involved only modest accom-
modations with the economic costs of protecting biodiversity, notably the 
requirement that post-listing designations of a species’s critical habitat must 
incorporate considerations of the “economic impact” of such a designa-
tion.79 
None of the reforms enacted immediately after Hill fundamentally al-
tered the standards of the listing process80 or the basic structure of the wider 
statute: as one commentator noted in the late 1970s, the reaction in Con-
                                                          
 74.  Id. at 184.   
 75.  See Petersen, supra note 72, at 485 (explaining that Hill created a widespread negative 
perception of the ESA with many viewing it as inflexible and antidevelopmental). 
 76.  See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 38,164 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1977) (statement of Rep. Watkins) 
(“There is a serious possibility that a mutation or long-distant cousin of the snail darter or some-
thing in my district will prevent any type of economic growth for our people.”).  For further dis-
cussion of this and similar statements, along with substantial detail about the historic opposition to 
Hill, see PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 39–77.   
 77.  PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 39–77.  In addition, such predictions can be found even in 
the dissenting opinions of Hill itself.  Hill, 437 U.S. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“I have little 
doubt that Congress will amend the Endangered Species Act to prevent the grave consequences 
made possible by today’s decision.”).   
 78.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 12, at 146–47 (discussing the various attempts, ultimately 
rejected, to “radically alter” the ESA immediately after Hill by replacing “absolute, biologically 
based jeopardy and adverse modification standards with an economic balancing test”).   
 79.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).  Moreover, areas may be excluded from critical habitat if “the 
benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical 
habitat, unless . . . the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction 
of the species concerned.”  Id.   
 80.  Although the listing process remained largely above this first wave in the broader cost-
benefit tide, it did undergo some minor alterations in these early rounds of ESA reform.  For ex-
ample, the relevant definition of species was amended, incorporating the term “distinct population 
segment,” (“DPS”) limiting the protection of population segments to vertebrates, and further clari-
fying that listing should be done “only when the biological evidence indicates that such action is 
warranted.”  S. REP. NO. 96-151, at 7 (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 2 (1978), codified in 16 
U.S.C. § 1532(16).   
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gress to Hill was “swift, immediate, and indecisive.”81  Nevertheless, some 
of the post-Hill ESA reforms enacted by Congress are valuable points of 
reference necessary to appreciate the full significance of the recent delisting 
and species exemption legislation discussed in Part II of this Article.82  In 
particular, two of these reforms created what one scholar has called “escape 
valves”: mechanisms that allow economic interests to openly influence or 
even frustrate the implementation of the ESA’s substantive protections for 
listed species.83 
First, Hill’s rejection of economic considerations led Congress to spe-
cifically exempt Tellico Dam from the ESA altogether through an appropri-
ations rider: a move that was denounced as an inappropriate—or even cor-
rupt—precedent.84  As will be discussed below, the precedent of carving out 
an exception to, or creating an exemption from, the ESA through a rider or 
an amendment to an otherwise unrelated piece of legislation did prove to be 
significant, as opponents of the ESA have continued to use this strategy 
through the present day.85  Tellico Dam was only the first such specific 
congressional exemption of the ESA’s substantive protections; and while 
these exemptions have tended to be relatively rare, the possibility of such 
legislative action continues to force interested parties and the relevant agen-
cies to weigh economic considerations when attempting to protect listed 
species.86 
Second, Hill led Congress to create an additional escape valve: the En-
dangered Species Committee, often referred to as the “God Squad.”87  Con-
gress vested the God Squad with the authority to exempt projects from the 
restrictions of Section 7 of the ESA, provided that the committee decided 
such a project is in the public interest, of regional or national significance, 
and that its benefits clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of 
action.88  Although the God Squad’s track record is extremely short,89 its 
                                                          
 81.  GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 1097; see also Sinden, supra note 12, at 146 
(noting that after Hill, “Congress ultimately opted to keep the basic structure and approach of the 
1973 Act in place, instead adding two escape valves that allow biological considerations to be bal-
anced against economic factors in certain limited circumstances”).  
 82.  See infra Part II. 
 83.  Sinden, supra note 12, at 146. 
 84.  E.g., Anthony Lewis, The Ultimate Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1980, at A23.  Ob-
viously, this earliest project-specific exemption bears a resemblance to the delisting and exemp-
tion legislation discussed infra, some of which has also been introduced as appropriations riders.   
 85.  See infra Part III. 
 86.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 6, at 1507 (noting that “even though Congress only rarely 
steps in to directly alter the outcome of a dispute under the ESA, the knowledge of that possibility 
colors virtually all negotiations under the Act, providing additional leverage to economic inter-
ests”).   
 87.  See Parenteau, supra note 40, at 133 (explaining the origin of the “God Squad”). 
 88.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)–(h) (2006).   
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mere existence has the potential to influence the implementation of the 
ESA’s substantive protections.90  Therefore, it serves as a constant reminder 
that the statute’s nominally absolute substantive standards are subject to ex-
ception.91 
Beyond these two escape valves, Hill sparked several additional re-
forms to the procedure for listing a species, including more substantial no-
tice requirements on listing agencies that involve local hearings, which pro-
vide additional opportunities for public comment—and therefore, public 
opposition.92  The controversy over Hill and the snail darter also deterred 
the listing agencies from further listings for a period of years.93  Wary of 
courting additional controversy, the process of new listings ground to a near 
halt, until Congress again turned its attention to the ESA in the early 
1980s.94 
B.  Continued Conflict and the “Listing Wars” 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hill and the legislative revisions of 
the late 1970s marked the beginning of the controversy over the ESA and 
its economic impacts, not its end.  Indeed, the ensuing conflict has proven 
to be so protracted, complex, and vituperative that it has often been com-
pared to warfare—a comparison that will be examined at greater length in 
Part IV.95  What follows in this Section is a very listing-centric account of 
                                                          
 89.  See, e.g., Parenteau, supra note 40, at 151 (noting that the God Squad is “basically a non-
factor in the administration of the ESA”).  Indeed, on one of the few occasions on which the En-
dangered Species Committee has convened, they unanimously declined to exempt Tellico Dam 
which they referred to as, inter alia, a “turkey” and “ill-conceived.”  Id. at 144.  The God Squad’s 
refusal to act, of course, led to the legislative exemption for Tellico Dam described in notes 84–
86, supra. 
 90.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 6, at 1504 (noting that although the Endangered Species 
Committee has rarely been convened, it may influence the statute’s implementation by “in-
creas[ing] the pressure on agency decision makers to covertly take economic and political consid-
erations into account”).   
 91.  Id.   
 92.  The requirements for local hearings were not the only additional procedural burdens im-
posed on the listing agencies during the post-Hill revisions of the late 1970s.  See, e.g., DALE D. 
GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 1097 (listing the ways in which the late 1970s 
ESA amendments “substantially expanded the procedure for listing a species,” including consid-
eration of the economic impacts of habitat designation and discretion to delay or withdraw listings 
if habitat was not determinable).   
 93.  STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 23 (explaining that “[l]inking the listing 
procedure to critical habitat designation and economic considerations almost completely halted 
new ESA listings.  Approximately 2,000 species proposed for listing were withdrawn from con-
sideration in 1978.”).   
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See, e.g., Jesup, supra note 32, at 328 (coining the term “the Listing Wars” and gathering 
references to other authors who have referred to these conflicts through the metaphor of warfare). 
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the continuing conflicts over the ESA from the early 1980s to the present 
day. 
After Hill, the next major conflict over the ESA, the listing process, 
and its rejection of economic considerations erupted in the early 1980s after 
the election of President Reagan and the appointment of James G. Watt as 
Secretary of the Interior.96  One major front in this conflict was opened by 
an executive order requiring all federal agencies to conduct cost-benefit 
analysis before issuing any major regulation, and further specifying that 
“[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to 
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.”97  Alt-
hough this executive order targeted allegedly burdensome and inefficient 
regulation across the executive branch, the listing agencies chiefly used the 
executive order to freeze new listings during the early 1980s.98  Even be-
yond its zealous application of this executive order, Watt’s Interior Depart-
ment was so hostile to new listings that the director of FWS’s Office of En-
dangered Species complained of “pseudo-legalistic ploys being used as ex-
excuses” to delay, preclude, or circumvent otherwise legitimate decisions 
about species facing extinction.99 
Public reaction to these changes was mixed,100 but the legislative reac-
tion was swift and one-sided, resulting in a wholesale rejection of economic 
considerations from the listing process.101  In 1982, Congress again amend-
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 338 (“With the arrival of the regulation-averse Reagan Administration, the listing 
program effectively came to a halt, [which] in turn was the impetus for the 1982 amendments to 
the ESA.”). 
 97.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, at § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. § 128 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(Supp. V. 1981).   
 98.  See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 55, at 1054 (“The Reagan administration had brought the 
[listing] process to a virtual standstill, primarily by requiring economic impact analysis of pro-
posed listings.”).   
 99.  1982 Endangered Species Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1982) (statement of John Spinks, Director, Office of Endangered Species, 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service).   
 100.  On the one hand, these attempts to curb the ESA and other landmarks of 1970s environ-
mental law were quite popular with the Sagebrush Rebellion, a movement with which President 
Reagan and Secretary Watt both identified.  E.g., PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 71 (noting that 
Reagan “rode into the White House as part of the sagebrush rebellion” and “called himself a 
‘Sagebrush Rebel’”).  On the other hand, the Reagan-Watt efforts to re-make the ESA sparked 
substantial membership growth in wildlife and biodiversity nongovernmental organizations.  Id. at 
72.   
 101.  See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 
2(b)(1)(A)(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1411 (explaining that the listing process will be made solely on the basis 
of “the best scientific and commercial data available to [the Secretary] after conducting a review 
of the status of the species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any 
State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to protect such 
species, whether by predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation 
practices, within any area under its jurisdiction, or on the high seas”). 
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ed the ESA, but this time the reforms were designed to ensure that the list-
ing process—which Congress called the “keystone” of the broader stat-
ute102—remained free from cost-benefit analysis and broader economic 
considerations.  More specifically, the 1982 ESA Amendments stated that 
listing determinations should be made “solely on the basis of the best scien-
tific . . . data available,”103 further specifying that economic considerations 
and cost-benefit analysis still needed to be excluded from the listing pro-
cess, even though they might be permissible or even mandatory considera-
tions when implementing other portions of the statute.104  Accordingly, alt-
hough President Reagan’s election may have marked the beginning of the 
broader cost-benefit turn in environmental and natural resources regulation, 
the 1982 ESA Amendments ensured that this turn did not substantially 
change the ESA’s listing process; rather, the 1982 ESA Amendments un-
derscored the unique nature of the listing process, reaffirming its distinctive 
exclusion of economic considerations amid the broader cost-benefit turn.105 
The 1982 ESA Amendments failed to end the widening controversy 
over the ESA, and debates about the exclusion of economic considerations 
from the listing process continued to grow in scope and intensity throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s.106  As in the late 1970s, previously obscure species, 
                                                          
 102.  H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 19 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2810.  
 103.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1) (2006).   
 104.  See H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 19–20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2819–
20 (stating that listing and delisting determinations should be based “solely on biological criteria” 
and without reference to possible economic or other impacts of such determination).  Indeed, 
while Congress noted that industry groups generally felt that economic considerations should be 
given greater weight under the Act, the 1982 amendments were specifically designed to “prevent 
non-biological considerations from affecting such decisions” and to “remove[] all non-biological 
criteria from the species listing process.”  Id.  
Beyond the provisions cited above, additional portions of the 1982 ESA Amendments were 
also expressly designed to roll back or forestall the incorporation of economic considerations into 
the listing process.  For example, one provision of the 1978 ESA Amendments required the con-
current designation of critical habitat with species listing.  Combined with the requirement that 
habitat designation be accompanied by cost-benefit analysis, this change threatened to transform 
the listing determination “from a biological to an economic one.”  James Salzman, Evolution and 
Application of Critical Habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 
322 (1990).  The 1982 ESA Amendments directly addressed this issue by permitting final listing 
decisions to be made even if critical habitat was not designated, for example if the cost-benefit 
analysis for specific critical habitats had not been completed.  Id. at 323; see also GOBLE & 
FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 1098 (“Section 4 was also amended to restructure the listing proce-
dure into a three-step process and the linkage between listing a species and designating its critical 
habitat was relaxed.”). 
 105.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text,. 
 106.  See, e.g., Marcilynn Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of 
the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 441, 443–
47, 454–97, 477–80 (2004) (discussing the effects increasingly heated rhetoric over “reform” and 
“rollbacks” accompanying debates about the ESA during the 1990s and early 2000s); PETERSEN, 
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whose potential listings threatened to impose substantial costs on industry 
and private landowners, proved to be the catalysts for the increasing contro-
versy.107  In addition, although the pace of listings increased after 1982, the 
backlog of candidate species had increased even more dramatically during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.108  This backlog, combined with lingering 
distrust of the listing agencies among many environmental groups even af-
ter Watt’s departure, resulted in an increasing amount of listing-related liti-
gation and the increasing politicization of the listing process.109 
While the listing debates in the 1980s and 1990s turned previously ob-
scure species, such as the northern spotted owl, into regular political foot-
balls and magnets for contentious litigation,110 they did not result in any ad-
ditional significant legislative revision to the substantive provisions of the 
statute.111  Accordingly, the 1982 ESA Amendments marked the final suc-
cessful and significant legislative revisions to the structure of the listing 
process.112  Congressional critics of the ESA and the listing process contin-
ued to advance numerous proposals for wide-ranging structural reform in 
the 1980s and 1990s, some of which will be discussed below.113  None of 
this legislation has substantially revised the formal structure of the listing 
process, nor has any legislation altered the listing process’s formal exclu-
sion of economic considerations—at least until very recently.114  However, 
although Congress did not pass any significant amendments to the substan-
                                                          
supra note 12, at 83–93 (discussing emerging controversies in the mid-1980s over species such as 
the northern spotted owl).  
 107.  See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 81–95 (discussing the political and legislative con-
flicts over listings in the 1980s related to previously obscure species, above all, the northern spot-
ted owl).   
 108.  E.g., STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 24–25 (explaining that “[w]hile the 
pace of species listings accelerated after 1982, the huge backlog of species considered candidates 
for listing often prevented quick action.  Several species suffered serious population declines or 
became extinct before they could be listed.”). 
 109.  Id. at 24 (“Although Watt did not last long as Secretary of the Interior, his imprimatur 
lingered and the Fish and Wildlife Service refrained from aggressively implementing and enforc-
ing the ESA throughout the 1980s.”).   
 110.  PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 111.  See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 44, at 182 (“Since 1988, when minor changes were made, 
legislative gridlock and risk aversion on all political sides have prevented amendment of the 
ESA.”).   
 112.  See, e.g., Jesup, supra note 32, at 338 (“With [the 1982 Amendments], section 4 [of the 
ESA] largely reached its current form.”).  
 113.  See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Doremus, supra note 44, at 182.  In an effort to alleviate concerns about the increasing 
backlog of candidate species, the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988), established requirements for monitoring the status of candidate spe-
cies, procedures for emergency listings of candidate species, and addressed candidate recovery 
plans.  While these did not dramatically change the listing process, they did reaffirm the listing 
process’s commitment to the Noah Principle—the intent to protect all species, regardless of cost.  
STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 25.  
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tive provisions of the ESA after 1982, legislative activity related to the ESA 
in the 1990s and 2000s did create more covert “wiggle room” for the con-
sideration of political and economic factors in the implementation of the 
statute.115 
While congressional opponents of the listing process and its exclusion 
of economic considerations failed in their efforts to re-write the substantive 
provisions of the ESA,116 they succeeded in curtailing the rate of listings in 
practice.117  For example, although an oft-overlooked alliance between 
Speaker Gingrich and congressional Democrats ultimately blocked drastic 
substantive revisions to the listing process in the mid-1990s,118 congres-
sional critics of the listing agencies succeeded in freezing and then shrink-
ing the listing budget during this time period.119  Moreover, in 1995, Con-
                                                          
 115.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 6, at 1493 (noting that the history of implementation of the 
ESA, like that of virtually every other legal standard, has “involve[d] a process of negotiation in 
which political and economic interests play a significant role,” and which creates “wiggle room” 
for these interests to be considered).   
 116.  For a discussion of some of the additional failed legislative attempts to reform the ESA’s 
general substantive terms during this time period—beyond the efforts discussed specifically in this 
Article—see, for example, Nagle, supra note 30, at 1173–74, 1204–07, describing hearings and 
three separate bills proposed to reform ESA.  These measures tended to be based on concerns very 
similar to those at the heart of the recent burst of species-specific exemption and delisting legisla-
tion.  See infra Part III.  Like the recent legislation discussed at length in this Article, these past 
legislative efforts were more frequently motivated by the alleged local economic impact of listing 
or potential listings of specific species.  See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 30, at 1205 (explaining how a 
proposed bill amending the ESA would require consideration of all the direct and indirect eco-
nomic impacts of protecting a species).   
Unlike the recent burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation, however, 
these past challenges tended to attempt to re-write the ESA’s general terms rather than the osten-
sibly more modest goals found in the recent delisting and exemption legislation.  See, e.g., Nagle, 
supra note 30, at 1205 (describing how proposed ESA amendments would require the Secretary of 
the Interior to determine the appropriate conservation goal for each individual species).  Such at-
tempts to reform the ESA’s general terms continue through the present day.  See, e.g., Matthew 
Brown, Lawmakers Seek Endangered Species Act Overhaul, ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 4, 
2014, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/ap-newsbreak-sought-
endangered-act-22360972 (detailing very recent fledgling efforts by federal legislators to reform 
the general provisions of the statute).  But these very recent efforts seem unlikely to meet with any 
greater success than the many failed past attempts to reform the generally applicable provisions of 
the ESA, as many commentators have already noted.  See id. (citing skepticism from Professors 
Goble and Ruhl that “the latest calls for change would succeed”).   The comparison between at-
tempts to re-write the ESA’s general terms and the recent species-specific delisting and exemption 
legislation will be explored further in Parts III and IV, infra.  
 117.  See e.g., STANFORD ENVTL. L. SOC’Y, supra note 53, at 70 (explaining how Congress 
was able to prevent new listings not by changing the ESA, but by restricting funds). 
 118.  See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, The Gingrich that Saved the ESA, 16 ENVTL. F. 26, 32 (1999) 
(discussing the mid-1990s alliance between Speaker Gingrich, congressional Democrats, academ-
ics, and biodiversity NGOs, as well as crediting Gingrich’s “singular role in saving the [ESA]” 
from proposed legislation in the mid-1990s that would have “almost certain[ly] dismember[ed]” 
the Act by, inter alia, introducing economic considerations to the listing process).   
 119.  See, e.g., D. Noah Greenwald, Kieran F. Suckling & Martin Taylor, The Listing Record, 
in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 12, at 51, 64–65 (reviewing the fund-
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gress even imposed a brief moratorium on all new listing activity, by with-
drawing funds for listing activities altogether.120  As with past challenges to 
the Act, many of these attempts to reshape the generally applicable terms of 
the ESA were motivated by concerns about the alleged local economic im-
pact of specific listings or potential listings.121 
The moratorium was lifted in 1996,122 but both the brief moratorium 
and the funding cuts substantially increased the backlog of species awaiting 
listing decisions, with predictable results.123  As in the 1980s, the increased 
backlog led to increased litigation by outside groups, which in turn led to 
increased opposition from industry groups and other critics of the formal 
exclusion of economic considerations from the listing process.124  Accord-
ingly, the moratorium, the funding cuts, and even the unsuccessful legisla-
tive attempts to re-write the ESA’s substantive provisions may have served 
to deter or influence listing activity, as the listing agencies considered the 
risk of similar future reprisals during decisions about new listings.125  
Moreover, in the late 1990s and 2000s, congressional opponents of the con-
tinued exclusion of economic considerations began shifting their focus.  In-
stead of repeating the failed efforts of the past and seeking wholesale revi-
                                                          
ing cuts and growing listing backlogs during this time period, and showing an inflation adjusted 
decline in the annual listing budgets from 1993–2002); see also PETERSEN, supra note 12, at x 
(“In the wake of the spotted owl crisis, the nation elected a conservative Congress that . . . targeted 
the ESA especially.”). 
 120.  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense 
to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86 
(1995).   
 121.  For example, the moratorium was sponsored by Senator Kay Hutchison of Texas, who 
was particularly concerned about ESA protection for the Barton Springs salamander.  Salamander 
Deaths Add to Debate Over Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/16/us/salamander-deaths-add-to-debate-over-protection.html.  
Contemporary opposition to the salamander’s listing in Texas was, of course, largely attributed to 
listing’s alleged local economic impact.  See e.g., Robert Bryce, Fishy, TEXAS MONTHLY, (Aug. 
1996), http://www.texasmonthly.com/content/fishy (quoting Senator Hutchison, and noting that 
“[t]he reasons for the salamander’s long wait have nothing to do with the salamander, of course, 
and everything to do with development”).  The habitat of the Barton Springs salamander is very 
closely related to the habitat of the salamanders discussed in Part III.D, infra.   
 122.  Congress authorized lifting the moratorium by means of a 1996 omnibus appropriations 
bill. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-159 to 162.   
 123.  See e.g., Jamison E. Colburn, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 237, 258 (2010) (describing the critical habitat backlog that lead to years 
of delay). 
 124.  Jesup, supra note 32, at 340–44. 
 125.  For examples of behavior by FWS in the 1990s that show the chilling or deterring effects 
of such legislation, see, for example, Nagle, supra note 30, at 1196–97 (discussing FWS’s listing 
decisions immediately after the moratorium was lifted).  Put another way, during the 1990s and 
2000s, opponents of the continued exclusion of economic considerations from the ESA began to 
explore ways to achieve their goals through indirect means.  E.g., Burke, supra note 106, at 446, 
477–80. 
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sions of the substantive terms of the ESA, the opponents began openly ad-
vocating for a more piecemeal approach, shifting to more subtle, indirect, 
gradual, and ostensibly limited efforts to break down the exclusion of eco-
nomic considerations from the ESA.126  Obviously, this shift has created an 
extremely favorable environment for the ostensibly limited species-specific 
exemption and delisting legislation discussed in Part III. 
In addition to these ongoing legislative efforts, executive action in the 
1990s and 2000s provided another avenue for ESA reform.127  Indeed, some 
commentators have claimed that executive action in the 1990s and the 
2000s amounted to a de facto administrative amendment of the ESA.128  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Clinton Administration enacted wide-
ranging executive reforms to the ESA—reforms designed, in theory, to save 
the ESA from more drastic legislative reform by reconciling the listing pro-
cess with economic development.129  More specifically, under Clinton’s 
administrative amendment of the ESA, new tools such as habitat conserva-
tion plans, the “no surprises” and “safe harbors” policies, and candidate 
conservation agreements allowed private landowners to receive permits for 
incidental takes of listed species, as well as freedom from additional re-
strictions that might be imposed if extinction pressures on listed or candi-
date species increase.130  These administrative reforms left the fundamental 
statutory norms unchanged, but they substantially altered the listing pro-
cess, as well as the ESA’s enforcement provisions, by creating space for 
negotiation, threats, and the consideration of political and economic factors 
by landowners, the listing agencies, and interested non-governmental or-
ganizations—even if some of these parties might have preferred the more 
                                                          
 126.  See, e.g., Burke, supra note 106 at 477 (quoting, for example, the chair of the House Re-
sources Committee, who said that he will no longer try to amend the ESA in sweeping legislation, 
but will instead try to “break it down” one piece at a time).   
 127.  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, While the Cat’s Asleep: The Making of the ‘New’ ESA, 12 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVT. 187, 187 (1998) (discussing ESA reform undertaken by the Clinton admin-
istration).   
 128.  See, e.g., GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 1098–99 (discussing “the administra-
tive amendment of the Endangered Species Act” from 1994 through 2001, which amounted to a 
“fourth Endangered Species Act of 1973”); Ruhl, supra note 127, at 187 (discussing how the Clin-
ton administration overhauled the ESA without going through Congress).   
 129.  Ruhl, supra note 127, at 187. 
 130.  Id. at 188–89; see also LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 9, at 74–81 (discussing 
regulations setting forth the requirements and policy aims related to Habitat Conservation Plans, 
50 C.F.R. Parts 401-53 (2004), the No Surprises Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998), Safe 
Harbor Agreements, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A), and Candidate Conservation Agreements Policy, 
64 Fed. Reg. 32726, 32733 (June 17, 1999)).  Some of these tools have played a significant role in 
the very recent opposition to the proposed listing of the dunes sagebrush lizard discussed in Part 
III, infra. 
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rigid prior model.131  In many ways, the pattern of threats, negotiation, and 
cooperation that emerged from this administrative reform of the listing pro-
cess is echoed in the similar process that has emerged from the recent 
delisting and exemption legislation that is discussed at length in Part IV of 
this Article.132 
Thus, although the substantive statutory provisions of the listing pro-
cess may have remained immune from significant revision after 1982, the 
combination of administrative reforms, the increased backlog of funding 
cuts and the moratorium, and even the potential deterrent effect of failed 
legislative challenges all caused the rate of new listings to decrease dramat-
ically in the 1990s and 2000s.133  These trends were further exacerbated by 
the extreme unwillingness of the listing agencies in the George W. Bush 
administration to approve many new listings, even when funds were made 
available by Congress.134  As in the 1980s and the 1990s, the increased 
backlog led to increased litigation by outside groups, which in turn led to 
increased opposition from industry groups and other critics of the formal 
exclusion of economic considerations from the listing process.135  A meas-
ure of relief in this long-running conflict—at least in the conflict between 
FWS and several environmental groups involved in litigation over large 
numbers of potential listings—may have been reached by recent settlement 
agreements.136  For critics of the listing process and its formal exclusion of 
economic considerations, however, the settlement of long-running litigation 
                                                          
 131.  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 863, 878 (2006) (suggesting that recent procedural reforms in adminis-
trative law have helped advance a new paradigm in which regulated entities may “contract 
around” otherwise applicable regulatory rules in pursuit of efficiency, and that the HCP program 
under the ESA represents one example of this trend).  With respect to the listing process of the 
ESA more narrowly, others have suggested that the combined effect of these administrative 
changes has made Section 4 decisionmaking into a best-practices system, characterized by alter-
nating threats and offers of cooperation, rather than a process of prescriptive regulation ruled by 
fundamental biocentric norms.  Colburn, supra note 123, at 245–47.   
 132.  In Part III infra, I discuss some direct precedent for the listing and delisting legislation 
studied in this Article—namely earlier, unsuccessful legislation that also sought to remove specif-
ic species from the listing process.  See infra Section III.A.  The administrative reform of the list-
ing process discussed immediately above provides another sort of precedent for the species-
specific activity discussed in this Article, because both have given rise to similar processes of 
threats, negotiation, and cooperation. Cf. infra notes 139–144 and accompanying text and Part IV.  
I am grateful to Jamison Colburn for correspondence exploring this point. 
 133.  Colburn, supra note 123 at 253–54; see also Greenwald, et al., supra note 119, at 55 
(tracing the decline in annual listings from 1993–2004, and noting the extreme decline in new list-
ings not driven by outside petitions and litigation from 1996–2004).  
 134.  ROMAN, supra note 55, at 186. 
 135.  For a useful summary of recent litigation involving the listing backlog by one of the par-
ticipants, see, for example, Jesup, supra note 32, at 348. 
 136.  See, e.g., id. at 386 (suggesting that “a combination of luck, good judgment, risk taking, 
and the logic of the situation” may have brought about an end to some of the recent litigation over 
the backlog of candidate species).   
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between listing agencies and environmental groups prompted concerns 
about new waves of potential listings and allegations about the local and re-
gional economic costs of such listings.137 
C.  The Historic Resilience of the Listing Process 
In sum, despite decades of conflict, frontal assaults upon the ESA’s 
exclusion of economic considerations and its commitment to the absolutist 
norms embodied in the Noah Principle have largely failed.138  Conversely, 
less direct efforts to reform the listing process through funding cuts, execu-
tive reform, negotiation, coercion, and deterrence have met with greater 
success.139  These indirect reforms have created a measure of “wiggle 
room” in which the listing agencies can and do reckon with the political and 
economic considerations that would seem to be formally excluded by the 
statute’s text and by the text and legislative history of subsequent amend-
ments.140  As seen above, and as many scholars have previously noted, po-
litical and economic considerations frequently influence and sometimes im-
pede the listing process, subject, of course, to countervailing political and 
litigation pressures in favor of listing specific species or the process’s gen-
eral biocentric norms.141  There is nothing particularly unusual about these 
                                                          
 137.  See, e.g., Taxpayer-Funded Litigation: Benefitting Lawyers and Harming Species, Jobs 
and Schools: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 112th Cong. 12 (2012) 
(statement of Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts), available at 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=298882 (claiming that “[i]n 
Texas, we are facing an unprecedented number of species under review for listing,” including the 
dunes sagebrush lizard, due to the settlement of litigation between FWS and environmental 
groups). 
 138.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
 140.  See supra notes 66, 115 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institu-
tional Challenges of New Age Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 56 (2001) (not-
ing that “the history of ESA implementation . . . provides a cautionary tale about flexibility and 
political pressure” in which the listing agencies “have used their considerable discretion under the 
ESA to respond to the political signals they receive . . . [frequently by] limiting species protec-
tion”); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Congressional Politics, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 12, at 68–71 (documenting the ways in which “political considera-
tions [tied to federal legislators] that have nothing to do with a species’ endangerment ranking or 
its genetic uniqueness” can “strongly influence[] the likelihood a species will be listed”); Colburn, 
supra note 123, at 288 (arguing, inter alia, that the listing agencies and other actors engaged with 
the ESA are participating in a risky and daunting act of political theater and faced with the tempta-
tion of using individual species “as a kind of political judo”); PETERSEN, supra note 12, at 119–25 
(describing the combination of cultural, political, and litigation pressures that have interacted with 
the broad discretion of the listing agencies to “determine[] which species get protected and how 
they get protected”).  
Of course, documenting the full history of political interference with and influence over the 
listing process is beyond the scope of this Article, but for windows into this history beyond the 
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patterns of negotiation, or in the practical influence won over time by eco-
nomic and political interests as these patterns of coercion and negotiation 
have been reiterated across several decades of the statute’s implementa-
tion.142  In a sense, then, the recent delisting and species-specific exemption 
legislation is nothing more than the latest outgrowth of this long process of 
evolution, through which political and economic considerations have be-
come part of individual listing considerations, and by which the listing pro-
cess itself has changed. 
Given this history of political interference in the listing process and the 
creation, over time, of this “wiggle room” in which political and economic 
considerations have come to be weighed against the biocentric formal im-
peratives of listing, why do so many scholars, regulators, and practitioners 
continue to insist that the ESA generally, and the listing process specifical-
ly, remains such a distinctive outlier amid the cost-benefit turn of recent 
decades?143  The answer has to do with the practical implementation of the 
ESA, which, as with so many other areas of environmental and natural re-
source law, involves complicated negotiations between a variety of political 
and economic interests operating at local, state, and federal levels.144 
What makes the ESA distinctive is that its absolute substantive stand-
ards have tended to act as unusually strong “trumps” in this process of coer-
cion and negotiation: trumps that are clearly weighted toward species pro-
tection and have tended to resist the gradual influence of the cost-benefit 
turn that has swept across so much of environmental and natural resources 
law.145  By operating as powerful trumps weighted toward species protec-
tion, the absolute and cost-blind statutory standards of the ESA fundamen-
tally alter the basic power dynamic that governs the typical pattern of nego-
tiation over most other environmental and natural resources statutes.146  
Thus, the ESA remains different, despite the procedural and practical ac-
commodations it has made over decades of implementation, because—
especially where the listing process is concerned—its absolutist statutory 
imperatives can shift the threat-and-cooperate dynamic between agencies, 
regulated individuals, and interested non-governmental organizations to-
                                                          
recent legislation and the specific species at the heart of this Article, see, for example, text accom-
panying notes 63–64, 75–109, 116–126, 135, 139–147. 
 142.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 6, at 1493–94 (noting that decades of practical implementa-
tion of the ESA, like “any legal standard,” has involved a repeated process of negotiation in which 
economic interests and considerations gain “covert influence over agency decision making”).   
 143.  See supra text accompanying notes 6–14, 28–30, 34, 40–41, 60, 68–79, 100–105, 110–
115. 
 144.  Sinden, supra note 6, at 1411. 
 145.  See, e.g., id. at 1494 (“Thus, the ESA’s absolute standards operate as a ‘trump’ or a 
thumb on the scale in favor of [environmental protection] . . . counteract[ing] the inevitable tug 
toward economic interests that the environmental power dynamic produces.”).   
 146.  Id. at 1509–10.  
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ward more biocentric norms than other environmental and natural resource 
statutes.147 
It is for this reason that the ESA has remained a general outlier amid 
the broader cost-benefit turn.148  The trumping functions of the ESA’s for-
mal standards and the resistance it imparts to the larger cost-benefit turn are 
common to the ESA as a whole.149  Within the larger framework of the 
ESA, however, the listing process has remained particularly resistant to 
economic considerations: its formal exclusion of economic considerations 
has been specifically reinforced by Congress rather than amended or com-
promised; and until very recently, it has not been affected by species-
specific legislative exceptions or exemptions.150  This resistance to the larg-
er cost-benefit turn is remarkable, but it is not guaranteed to continue in the 
future; and as Part III will show, recent species-specific legislative delisting 
and exemption efforts have already begun to compromise the ESA’s long-
standing resistance in novel ways. 
In one sense, therefore, it is doubly incorrect to call these recent legis-
lative efforts unprecedented in a literal sense, as the popular press and some 
interested parties have done.151  For example,  as will be seen below, strik-
ingly similar efforts have been attempted previously, though these prior at-
tempts at delisting legislation have often been overlooked in histories of the 
ESA because they were only briefly considered and overwhelmingly reject-
ed by Congress.152  Moreover, and far more importantly, the recent legisla-
tion is an outgrowth of the larger trend outlined above in Part II, by which 
economic and political considerations have been incorporated into the list-
ing process.  In another sense, however, calling the recent legislative efforts 
unprecedented does accurately capture their potential significance as vehi-
cles that may transform the standard picture of the listing process, under-
mining the weight that the statute’s formal norms play in the threat-and-
cooperate dynamic between legislators, regulators, landowners, and other 
interested parties, while providing new avenues for the consideration of 
economic and political interests in listing decisions.  Even when this recent 
species-specific legislation is not enacted, it provides federal legislators op-
posed to the ESA generally, and individual listings specifically, with lever-
                                                          
 147.  See id. at 1508 (stating that the standards of the ESA help favor environmental interests). 
 148.  See id. at 1509–10 (“This power shift ultimately leads to politically negotiated outcomes 
that—while perhaps less protective of species than a literal reading of the ESA might dictate—are 
nonetheless substantially closer to the results” achievable “under virtually any set of ideal criteria” 
than results from cost-benefit analysis).   
 149.  See id. at 1411 (citing the ESA as an example of a statute which uses environmental in-
terests as trumps over considerations of economic cost). 
 150.  See infra Part III. 
 151.  See infra note 156 and accompanying text.  
 152.  See infra Part III.A. 
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age at once more powerful and precise than a threat to re-write the broadly 
applicable statutory provisions governing the listing process.  Parts III and 
IV will explore how this recent legislation has been used precisely as such a 
compellent threat, as well as a tool to amplify local and regional opposition 
to listings and the ESA more generally. 
III.  A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE LISTING PROCESS: SPECIES-SPECIFIC 
DELISTING AND EXEMPTION LEGISLATION 
The recent burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation 
has attracted less attention and opposition than previous legislative efforts 
to incorporate economic considerations into the listing process.153  Indeed, 
some environmental groups are divided about its relative merits—or, at 
least, some environmental groups have been somewhat hesitant to criticize 
individual examples of recent species-specific exemption legislation.154  
Moreover, although many environmental groups have been highly critical 
of specific examples of this legislation, they have tended to examine it 
alongside other recent legislative attempts to reform the ESA, which—
unlike the recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation—are 
functionally similar to past legislative challenges to the ESA.155 
In other words, even though the recent delisting and exemption legisla-
tion tends to be called “unprecedented” or “unparalleled”156—somewhat in-
                                                          
 153.  See e.g., Sylvia Fallon & Elly Pepper, Endangered Science, 9 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & 
ENV’T. 479, 479 (2011) (“While Congress is hard at work removing science from wildlife protec-
tion efforts, many scientists continue to sit on the sidelines, either out of fear that advocating for 
species protection will compromise their scientific integrity or because they simply don’t know 
how to engage.”). 
 154.  See infra notes 253–256.   
 155.  See, e.g., Fallon & Pepper, supra note 153, at 479 (noting that species-specific exemption 
legislation is part of a recent “flood of bills and amendments attacking the ESA,” and suggesting 
that the “most worrisome are the bills that would simply derail the ESA altogether”); see also 
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ASSAULT ON WILDLIFE: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT UNDER 
ATTACK 3 (2011) (discussing recent legislative attacks on the ESA, some of which “single out 
species deemed unworthy of our protection”). 
 156.  See, e.g., Felicity Barringer & John M. Broder, Congress, in a First, Removes an Animal 
From the Endangered Species List, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2011, at A16 (“Congress for the first 
time is directly intervening in the Endangered Species List . . . establishing a precedent for politi-
cal influence over the list that has outraged environmental groups.”); Christopher Ketcham, 
Wolves to the Slaughter, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, March 2012, at 3–4 (“In April 2011, follow-
ing a series of lawsuits and an unprecedented intervention by Congress, canis lupus was removed 
from the endangered species list.”); Erika Bolstad, GOP Lawmakers Take Aim at Endangered 
Species Act, MCCLATCHYDC, (June 26, 2011), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/26/116489/gop-lawmakers-take-aim-at-endangered.html 
(“The Endangered Species Act has long had its foes, particularly in the West.  But in recent 
months, the law has taken an unprecedented hit from Congress” as a result of the wolf delisting 
bill); Laura Zuckerman, Wyoming Wolves to Lose Endangered Species Act Protection, REUTERS, 
AUG. 31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/01/us-usa-wolves-wyoming-
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accurately, as noted at the end of Part II—it has not attracted the attention 
or response that these labels would seem to deserve.157  First, the recent 
species-specific delisting and exemption legislation is very new indeed, and 
it has originated in many different places in a short period of time; at first 
blush, each instance represents only the most modest compromise to the 
fundamental norms of the ESA.  This combination makes it difficult to ap-
preciate the significance of the larger whole.  Moreover, each individual in-
stance in the recent burst of delisting and exemption legislation does not 
represent the same apparent challenge to the conventional understanding of 
the ESA as, for example, legislation to block funding for new listings alto-
gether.158 
In addition, not all recent delisting and exemption legislation has been 
created equally.159  For example, some recent delisting legislation appears 
to be species-specific at first glance, but upon closer examination this legis-
lation is revealed to be essentially identical to past failed attempts to rewrite 
the general provisions of the ESA rather than ostensibly modest single-
species exceptions.160  Furthermore, some recent species-specific delisting 
                                                          
idUSBRE88000P20120901 (noting that “Idaho and Montana wolves ultimately were delisted last 
year through an unprecedented act of Congress”).   
 157.  See, e.g., Fallon & Pepper, supra note 153, at 479 (“While Congress is hard at work re-
moving science from wildlife protection efforts, many scientists continue to sit on the sidelines, 
either out of fear that advocating for species protection will compromise their scientific integrity 
or because they simply don’t know how to engage.”).  
 158.  See, e.g., id. (discussing the “most worrisome” recent ESA legislation, such as the “Ex-
tinction Rider, which would have blocked funding to list any new endangered species”).   
 159.  See id. (noting the different types of legislation, which range from “amend[ing] the Act to 
exempt certain species,” exempting species “in specific locations” and “certain situations,” and 
“block[ing] funding to list any new endangered species”).  
 160.  The relevant example here is the unsuccessful Discredit Eternal Listing Inequality of 
Species Takings Act, H.R. 1042, 112th Cong. 1 (2011), a bill with a cumbersome title whose ap-
parent meaning becomes more clear as an acronym (the “DELIST” Act).  Despite its timing and 
obviously suggestive title, the DELIST Act is actually quite different from most examples of the 
recent burst of species-specific exemption or delisting legislation at the heart of this Article.   
Like the other examples of recent delisting and exemption legislation discussed in this Arti-
cle, the DELIST Act was clearly targeted at a single species: all thirty of its findings are exclu-
sively related to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, a species that has long been a magnet for 
ESA-related controversy.  Id.  Also, like the other examples of recent delisting and exemption leg-
islation discussed in this Article, the DELIST Act was clearly driven by the perceived local eco-
nomic costs of continued listing for the species at issue.  See id. at § 2(3) (“The Delhi Sands Flow-
er-loving Fly’s listing . . . may be in conflict with construction or other development projects or 
other forms of economic activity.”).   
Unlike the species-specific legislation discussed more extensively in Part III of this Article, 
however, the DELIST Act purports to revise the fundamental structure of the ESA in a single 
stroke instead of confining itself to a single species’s delisting or exemption.  In other words, in-
stead of simply carving out a listing exception for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, the 
DELIST Act would have amended § 4 of the ESA to provide that after fifteen years, all listed spe-
cies should be treated as extinct, and therefore ineligible for further listing or protection, unless 
certain express findings were made.  Id. at § 3.  Accordingly, despite its suggestive title, the 
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or exemption legislation has been caught up in wider debates over environ-
mental issues that extend far beyond the ESA.161  Such bills may be facially 
similar or even identical to the legislation discussed at greater length in this 
Article, but the context in which they arise, and thus their intended and ac-
tual effects, may be very different indeed from the highly localized context 
of the species-specific delisting and exemption legislation discussed in 
more detail in Parts III and IV of this Article. 
In sum, therefore, there are many reasons why the recent burst of 
delisting and exemption legislation has remained relatively obscure.162  Yet, 
as Parts III and IV will show, this recent species-specific delisting legisla-
                                                          
DELIST Act has much more in common with failed attempts in previous decades to rewrite the 
generally applicable provisions of the ESA than it does with the recent burst of species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation at the heart of this Article.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
DELIST Act met with a similar fate, failing on every metric: the fly is still listed, and its author, 
Congressman Joe Baca, was defeated in a subsequent primary election.  Cf., e.g., infra Part III.B-
C.   
 161.  The relevant example here is the Polar Bear Delisting Act, H.R. 39, 112th Cong. 1 
(2011), a bill that, unlike the DELIST Act, has much in common with the examples of the species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Article.  
Indeed, unlike the DELIST Act, it would be appropriate to call this bill an example of the recent 
burst of species-specific delisting legislation: this short legislation is designed solely to ensure that 
“[t]he determination by [FWS] of the threatened status for the polar bear . . . under the [ESA], and 
the listing of such species as a threatened species under that Act . . . shall have no force or effect.”  
Id. at § 2.   
The Polar Bear Delisting Act is unusual, however, because the underlying debate about the 
polar bear’s listing is itself somewhat unusual, insofar as it opens the possibility that the ESA 
could be used as a vehicle to address climate change.  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and 
the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2008) (noting that the “polar bear thus serve[s] as [an] example[] of the tension global climate 
change will create in the administration of the ESA and other environmental laws”); Lawrence 
Hurley, Polar Bear Fight Returns to Court, E&E PUBL’G (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059971516 (“Some environmentalists think the [ESA] could be 
used as a vehicle to prompt action to tackle [climate change] if the polar bear is deemed to be un-
der threat due to the changes in climate.”).  Therefore, the debate over this legislation is quite dif-
ferent from the debates related to other recent delisting or exemption legislation discussed else-
where in Part III, infra, which overwhelmingly tend to involve highly localized alleged economic 
impacts.  Accordingly, the polar bear delisting legislation may be a good example of the geo-
graphic breadth of recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation, but it is otherwise 
not particularly representative of this recent trend.  For a very recent discussion of the central im-
portance of climate change to FWS’s polar bear listing, see In re Polar Bear Endangered Species 
Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 F.3d 1, 2–3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding FWS’s con-
clusion that the polar bear is threatened based in part on FWS’s finding that climatic changes have 
and will jeopardize polar bear populations).  
 162.  This legislation has not, of course, been entirely hidden from critical attention.  See, e.g., 
Holly Doremus, Gray Wolf Update: Rider Upheld and Wyoming Delisting a Step Closer, 
LEGALPLANET (Aug. 5, 2011), http://legal-planet.org/2011/08/05/gray-wolf-update-rider-upheld-
and-wyoming-delisting-a-step-closer/ (noting that “[s]everal environmental groups challenged the 
constitutionality” of the rider to delist the gray wolf).   
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tion richly deserves to be considered in careful detail.163  Accordingly, Part 
III.A below examines the predecessors of the recent burst of species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation.  Parts III.B and III.C then turn 
to two of the most salient examples of the recent legislation, namely, the 
struggles over the delisting of the gray wolf and the potential listing of the 
dunes sagebrush lizard.  Part III.D discusses several additional examples of 
recent delisting and exemption legislation, including examples that have ei-
ther only recently emerged or that may erupt again in the near future. 
A.  Predecessors of the Recent Delisting and Exemption Legislation 
To the extent that it has attracted attention in the popular press or by 
activists, whether positive or negative, the recent burst of species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation has often been called “unprecedented” 
or “unparalleled.”164  In one sense, it is: the recent legislation is dramatical-
ly different from its predecessors in its scope, success, and the lack of atten-
tion and backlash among the wider public.165  These differences, and the 
true significance of the recent delisting and exemption legislation, however, 
can only be fully appreciated after examining its under-examined predeces-
sors. 
Of course, every previous attempt to reform the ESA that was trig-
gered by a particularly heated conflict over a specific species can be seen as 
a predecessor of the recent wave of species-specific delisting and exemption 
legislation.166  As Part IV will show, however, the present wave of delisting 
and exemption legislation poses a different challenge than previous failed 
                                                          
 163.  The political dynamics and consequences surrounding some of these examples of recent 
species-specific delisting and exemption legislation may well differ in important respects.  For 
example, one might well believe the gray wolf delisting legislation that was ultimately passed dif-
fered in important ways in its intent and effect from, for example, earlier gray wolf delisting bills 
and the dunes sagebrush lizard legislation, both of which might seem to have been introduced 
primarily as tools for rallying state and local support and for negotiating with FWS along the lines 
discussed in Part IV, infra.   
Exploring these distinctions, while precluded here for reasons of timing and space, may be 
useful for future work.  But I believe it would be a mistake to allow these distinctions to obscure 
the similarities between much of this ostensibly disparate legislation.  Compare, e.g., infra notes 
202–210 and accompanying text (discussing the intent and effects of the recent gray wolf delisting 
legislation that was introduced, and did not pass, prior to the February 2011 appropriations rider 
that was enacted), with, e.g., infra notes 223–265 and accompanying text (discussing the intent 
and effects of the recent dunes sagebrush lizard legislation).   
 164.  See supra note 156. 
 165.  See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 166.  See, e.g., Phil Taylor, Budget’s Wolf Delisting Opens Pandora’s Box of Species Attacks, 
Enviro Groups Warn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/13/13greenwire-budgets-wolf-delisting-opens-pandoras-
box-of-s-99159.html (noting the wolf delisting legislation “is not the only time lawmakers have 
tried to remedy the effects of ESA,” and connecting this legislation with, for example, the Tellico 
Dam legislative exemption).   
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attempts to rewrite the generally applicable substantive provisions of the 
Act or even previous ostensibly limited exceptions like the one made for 
Tellico Dam.167  It is far more useful, therefore, to look closely at a few un-
der-examined and unsuccessful direct predecessors to the recent delisting 
and exemption legislation, in which federal legislators also attempted to 
write single species entirely out of the ESA.168 
Three unsuccessful species-specific delisting amendments, all of 
which were introduced in the House of Representatives during debates in 
1987,169 represent the closest relatives to the recent delisting and exemption 
legislation.170  In December of 1987, representatives from both major par-
ties representing congressional districts in Texas, Montana, and Oklahoma 
offered legislation to delist the Concho water snake, the gray wolf, and the 
leopard darter, respectively.171  This 1987 legislation closely resembles the 
recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation in several im-
portant ways.  First, the 1987 legislation did not purport to amend the 
ESA’s generally applicable substantive terms.  Rather, each provided, in 
language functionally identical to the recent legislation, only that the specif-
ic species at issue should “not be considered an endangered or threatened 
species” under the ESA.172  Furthermore, the authors of the failed 1987 
amendments, like many of the authors of legislation in the recent delisting 
and exemption wave, expressly disclaimed any desire to amend the ESA 
generally.173  In addition, like the recent legislation, the failed 1987 
                                                          
 167.  See infra Part IV. 
 168.  See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 35,039 (1987) (statement of Rep. Stenholm) (attempting to 
delist the Concho water snake); 133 CONG. REC. 35,046 (1987) (statement of Rep. Marlenee) (at-
tempting to delist the gray wolf); 133 CONG. REC. 36,088 (1987) (statement of Rep. Watkins) (at-
tempting to delist the leopard darter).  
 169.  Through fiscal year 1992, ESA funding was specifically and periodically reauthorized by 
Congress on a multi-year basis.  The unsuccessful delisting legislation from December 1987 dis-
cussed in this Section arose in the form of proposed amendments to what became the last of these 
periodic reauthorization bills, Public Law No. 100-478, which authorized appropriations for the 
ESA from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year 1992.  (Since 1992, Congress has appropriated 
funds for ESA activities on an annual basis.)  Accordingly, these early delisting amendments arose 
in a different context than much of the delisting or exemption amendments in recent years, which 
have been associated with much more wide-ranging appropriations legislation.   
 170.  See supra note 168. 
 171.  See supra note 168. 
 172.  See supra note 168.  
 173.  See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 36,088 (1987) (statement of Rep. Watkins) (“Mr. Chairman, 
the amendment I have . . . would not significantly affect any other congressional district but my 
own,” because it “simply removes the leopard darter from the threatened and endangered species 
list.”).   
Similar claims were made for the ostensibly limited nature of the other 1987 species-specific 
delisting legislation which track, very closely, the claims that have been made for the ostensibly 
limited nature of the very recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation. Compare, 
e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 35,046 (1987) (statement of Rep. Marlenee) (“Mr. Chairman, my amend-
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amendments enjoyed a limited measure of bipartisan support, although in 
1987 the combined degree of support for these failed amendments was ul-
timately insufficient.174 
Even the arguments for and against the failed 1987 amendments are 
strikingly similar to the arguments that have been raised in the debate over 
the recent delisting and exemption legislation.175  Supporters of the 1987 
amendments, like supporters of the individual components of the recent leg-
islation, repeatedly pointed to the alleged local and regional economic costs 
imposed by continued listing.  For example, the author of the failed 1987 
gray wolf delisting amendment argued that without its passage, state fish 
and wildlife agencies in the upper Rockies could not continue to provide 
“world famous big game populations” of elk, moose, and big horn sheep,176 
while the supporters of both the leopard darter and Concho water snake 
failed delisting amendments pointed to the local costs continued listing 
would impose on local water projects, which they expressly compared to 
the saga of the snail darter and Tellico Dam.177 
In sum, therefore, the recent delisting and exemption legislation re-
sembles, in many respects, the largely forgotten failed 1987 delisting 
amendments.  Indeed, in one instance, they involve the same species.178  
Moreover, although the 1987 delisting legislation failed, it served as an un-
mistakable and specific threat to the listing agencies,179 which some have 
argued succeeded in compelling the listing agencies to step back from sub-
                                                          
ment is simple and straightforward.  It merely removes the gray wolf from the endangered species 
list and thereby allows the state fish and wildlife agencies to manage the gray wolf without inter-
ference.”), with Taylor, supra note 166 (quoting Senator Tester’s claim that “[w]e didn’t amend 
the Endangered Species Act . . . [instead,] [w]e asked that a recovered species . . . be taken off and 
managed just how we manage elk and mule deer and antelope and everything else”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Barringer & Broder, supra note 156 (the budget rider delisting the gray wolves 
was backed by Senator Tester, a Democrat from Montana, and Representative Simpson, a Repub-
lican from Idaho). 
 175.  See supra note 168. 
 176.  133 CONG. REC. 35,046 (1987) (statement of Rep. Marlenee). 
 177.  133 CONG. REC. 35,039 (1987) (statement of Rep. Stenholm); 133 CONG. REC. 36,088 
(1987) (statement of Rep. Watkins); 133 CONG. REC. 36,091 (1987) (statement of Rep. Young).   
 178.  See 133 CONG. REC. 35,046 (1987) (statement of Rep. Marlenee) (providing that “the 
gray wolf, Canis Lupus, shall not be considered an endangered or threatened species” under the 
ESA); Ketcham, supra note 156, at 3–4 (“In April 2011, following a series of lawsuits and an un-
precedented intervention by Congress, canis lupus was removed from the endangered species 
list.”). 
 179.  See, e.g., Houck, supra note 25, at 294 (discussing the 1987 delisting legislation as an 
example of a larger pattern of negotiation between listing agencies and listing opponents, and 
comparing it to “the first step of an extended ballet in which the agency balances the benefits of 
implementing the Act’s requirements against such other factors as . . . perceived risks to the sur-
vival of the Act itself”).   
 2014] HIDDEN RISE OF ‘EFFICIENT’ (DE)LISTING 425 
sequent protective measures for the species at issue.180  As will be seen be-
low, especially in Part III.C, this pattern has been repeated in the recent 
delisting and exemption battles, although to much greater effect: thanks to 
the administrative reforms of the ESA that have taken place since the late 
1980s delisting legislation,181 the compellent pressure applied by the recent 
dunes sagebrush lizard exemption legislation helped forestall the proposed 
listing altogether.182 
Despite the many similarities, the recent burst of species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation differs from its 1987 predecessors in 
many important ways.  For example, the 1987 delisting amendments were 
folded into a general debate about the ESA that was virtually identical to 
those discussed in Part II.  In contrast, most examples of the recent delisting 
and exemption wave of legislation do not occur as part of any larger debate, 
unless they are tied to otherwise unrelated appropriations measures for tac-
tical reasons.183  As will be shown in Part IV, this intensely local framing is 
highly advantageous for listing opponents.  In a related point, the 1987 
delisting amendments were simply offered up, once, on the floor of the 
House.184  In contrast, many examples of the recent delisting and exemption 
legislation have been advanced many times, and when they are advanced, 
they often serve to focus and amplify local and regional opposition to the 
listed species, independent of their fate in Congress.185  Finally, of course, 
the recent burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation has 
already proven more successful than its 1987 predecessors, at least for the 
time being.186  The recent legislation has, therefore, at least partially justi-
fied the gloomy predictions made during the debates over the 1987 delisting 
legislation: if Congress “make[s] an exception for one species, we soon will 
                                                          
 180.  See id. (claiming that while the species-specific delisting legislation may have failed, the 
“pressure” it generated was “not without effect,” because the listing agencies subsequently “per-
mitted a water resources project to . . . eliminate roughly half of the Concho snake’s habitat”).   
 181.  See supra Parts II.A–C. 
 182.  See infra Part III.C. 
 183.  See, e.g., infra note 204 and accompanying text.   
 184.  See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 35,039 (1987) (statement of Rep. Stenholm) (attempting to 
delist the Concho water snake); 133 CONG. REC. 35,046 (1987) (statement of Rep. Marlenee) (at-
tempting to delist the gray wolf); 133 CONG. REC. 36,088 (1987) (statement of Rep. Watkins) (at-
tempting to delist the leopard darter). 
 185.  See infra Part IV.   
 186.  See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 36,093 (1987) (statement of Rep. Schneider) (the amendment 
to delist the leopard darter was defeated 273 to 136); 133 CONG. REC. 35,049 (1987) (statement of 
Rep. Marlenee) (the amendment to delist the gray wolf was withdrawn); 133 CONG. REC. 35,041 
(1987) (statement of Rep. Stenholm) (the amendment to delist the Concho water snake was with-
drawn).  
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be asked to do it for another species and another species and so on with no 
end in sight.”187 
B.  Delisting the Gray Wolf 
What little public and academic discussion exists about the recent 
burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation tends to focus 
on the gray wolf, for obvious reasons.188  First, the gray wolf delisting legis-
lation was successful in a straightforward and entirely novel way.189  More-
over, the gray wolf delisting legislation had particular political salience, 
given both its strong bipartisan backing as well as its alleged importance to 
the Senate reelection of one of its primary supporters.190 
Of course, other reasons exist for the relative prominence of the gray 
wolf delisting story—reasons tied more closely to the gray wolf itself.  As a 
keystone predator and one of the first listed species, the gray wolf is a per-
fect example of the charismatic megafauna that were most prominent in the 
early history of the ESA.191  Indeed, protecting the existing gray wolf popu-
lation and restoring some of the population’s former range have long had 
                                                          
 187.  133 CONG. REC. 36,091 (1987) (statement of Rep. Jones).  Congressman Jones also ar-
gued that such an exception would establish a “very bad precedent,” because “[w]hile the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service may be well equipped to assess complicated and often contradictory 
biological information, we in Congress are not.”  Id.  Congressman Jones was not alone in his 
prediction that passage of such legislation would prove to be “a terribly dangerous precedent.”  Id. 
at 36,093 (statement of Rep. Thomas); see also id. at 35,040 (statement of Rep. Studds) (“This is 
the first of what will in all likelihood be a series of proposals to delist, to remove from the endan-
gered or threatened list, specific species . . . [and] it would set an extraordinarily bad precedent.”); 
id. at 36,092 (statement of Rep. Schneider) (arguing that delisting legislation “is a move in the 
wrong direction . . . [and] could be a very bad precedent to set”). 
 188.  See, e.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, Delisting Wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains: 
Congress Cries Wolf, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10840 (2009) (analyzing the effects 
of proposed legislation delisting gray wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountain region). 
 189.  See infra text accompanying notes 216–219. 
 190.  See, e.g., Ketcham, supra note 156 (gathering sources arguing that the Obama Admin-
istration and congressional Democrats’ acquiescence to the wolf delisting aimed to reelect Senator 
Jon Tester); see also Matthew Frank, Why Tester’s Sportsmen’s Act Hit a Snag in the Senate, 
MISSOULA INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2012, 11:23 AM), 
http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/IndyBlog/archives/2012/11/28/why-testers-sportsmens-act-
hit-a-snag-in-the-senate (referring to the “precedent-setting removal of gray wolves from the en-
dangered species list” as “arguably [Tester’s] greatest legislative achievement”).   
 191.  E.g., Species Profile for Gray Wolf (Canis Lupus), UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=A00D (last vis-
ited Nov. 30, 2013) (profiling the gray wolf and relevant conservation efforts).   
Indeed, the gray wolf was covered by one of the ESA’s predecessors, the Endangered Spe-
cies Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, which was repealed in 1973.  At 
the time of its first, pre-ESA listing, the gray wolf was listed as the Timber Wolf (Canis lupus ly-
caon), 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967).   
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particular significance to many, both within the environmental community 
and the broader public at large.192 
Whatever one thinks about either the merits of protecting the gray wolf 
or its recent delisting, the species has benefited greatly from ESA protec-
tion.193  By the 1940s, the species was practically extinct across much of the 
continental United States, including the northern Rockies; however, after 
decades of protection under the ESA and reintroduction to portions of its 
former range, the species had recovered to some extent, with an estimated 
1,500 wolves in the northern Rockies by the mid-2000s.194  At the same 
time, the gray wolf has also long been a lightning rod for debates about the 
economic impact of the ESA, especially in the western United States, as 
ranchers have complained about livestock predation from expanding and 
reintroduced wolf populations.195 
By the mid-2000s, concerns about the costs of protecting the gray wolf 
boiled over, especially among states in the northern Rockies with high 
numbers of ranchers.196  FWS received several petitions to delist the wolf 
on the grounds that after decades of protection, it was no longer under any 
threat of extinction.197  Beginning in 2003, FWS attempted to re-classify 
several wolf populations in the continental United States as distinct popula-
tion segments, and then to either downgrade the listing status of or delist 
these various segments.198  Litigation ensued, and a string of federal court 
                                                          
 192.  Aldo Leopold’s oft-cited passage from Thinking Like a Mountain about the death of an 
old wolf provides a good example of the particular significance of wolves in debates about pro-
tecting biodiversity during the creation of the ESA and beyond.  ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND 
COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 129–32 (1949). 
 193.  See, e.g., Justin Pidot: The Gray Wolf Delisting Revisited, LEGALPLANET (Aug. 16, 
2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/08/16/guest-blogger-justin-pidot-the-gray-wolf-
delisting-revisited/ (objecting to the species-specific delisting rider, but suggesting that “we ill-
serve the [ESA] and biodiversity conservation more generally when we object too strenuously to 
delisting canus [sic] lupus” because the gray wolf’s recovery means “this is a time [to] declare 
that the ESA has worked”).   
 194.  See e.g., Frank Clifford, Wolves and the Balance of Nature in the Rockies, SMITHSONIAN, 
Feb. 2009, at 11 (documenting the clash between wolf reintroduction and cattle ranching). 
 195.  See, e.g., Montana Cattlemen’s Association et al., Who Is Paying for the Wolves?, 
http://graywolfnews.com/pdf/missoulianwolfad.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (documenting al-
leged livestock losses through 2008–09 caused by wolves in Montana).   
Opposition to expanding wolf populations is not limited to the ranching industry, but ranch-
ing and livestock interests “dominated the anti-wolf lobby” and contributed mightily to the authors 
and supporters of the wolf delisting legislation.  Ketcham, supra note 156.  
 196.  Clifford, supra note 194, at 11. 
 197.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Service Concludes that Delisting 
the Gray Wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains May Be Warranted (Oct. 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/05-78.htm (responding to two petitions urging 
delisting and concluding that delisting may be warranted). 
 198.  See, e.g., 74 Fed. Reg. 15123 (Apr. 2, 2009) (identifying a Northern Rocky Mountains 
wolf DPS and then delisting this DPS, except within the boundaries of Wyoming); 72 Fed. Reg. 
6052 (Feb. 8, 2007) (identifying a Western Great Lakes wolf DPS and then delisting this DPS); 68 
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rulings vacated these delistings and downgrades.199  Frustrated by the re-
sults of this litigation, opponents of the wolf’s continued listing turned to 
both their federal legislators and respective state and local governments.200  
This backlash had several results, including open defiance by state and local 
officials of the continued federal protections for wolves201—an extreme re-
action, though not unheard of in equally contentious past disputes over oth-
er listed species.202 
The most interesting response, however, came from federal legislators 
of both political parties who represented states with relatively high wolf 
populations.  These legislators scrapped the standard plan used in past ESA 
conflicts, largely eschewing any attempt to re-write the general provisions 
of the ESA or cut the listing agencies’ overall funding, and opting instead 
for a more limited, piecemeal approach.203  Beginning in 2010, these legis-
lators introduced a flurry of legislation with an ostensibly narrow purpose: 
to delist the gray wolf across all or part of its then-protected range, in order 
to prevent the economic harm allegedly inflicted by wolf predation.204 
                                                          
Fed. Reg. 15804 (Apr. 1, 2003) (identifying Western, Eastern, and Southwestern wolf DPS, and 
then downgrading the Eastern and Western DPS from endangered to threatened).  For an explana-
tion of the concept of a distinct population segment, see supra note 80.   
 199.  See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010), stay 
denied, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Mont. 2011) (vacating 74 Fed. Reg. 15123); Humane Society of 
the United States v. Kempthorne, 579 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008) (vacating 72 Fed. Reg. 6052); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2005) 
(vacating 68 Fed. Reg. 15804).   
 200.  See, e.g., W. Ryan Stephens, Note, Gray Wolf Rising: Why the Clash over Wolf Man-
agement in the Northern Rockies Calls for Congressional Action to Define “Recovery” Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 917, 935 (2012) (discussing 
the concerns of ranchers following delisting litigation). 
 201.  See, e.g., Matthew Brown, Montana Won’t Wait to Kill Wolves, AP STATE & LOCAL 
WIRE, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Feb/16/apnewsbreak-mont-wont-
wait-to-kill-wolves/ (detailing comments made by the governor of Montana encouraging ranchers 
to kill wolves that threaten livestock).   
 202.  See, e.g., J. Zane Walley, The Wasting of Catron County, RANGE MAGAZINE 36 (2000), 
available at http://www.rangemagazine.com/archives/stories/summer00/catron_county.htm (dis-
cussing the history of local resistance to the ESA in the “birth[place of] the county independence 
movement”).   
 203.  See supra note 126.  
 204.  See, e.g., State Sovereignty Wildlife Management Act, H.R. 6485, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) 
(providing that “inclusion of the gray wolf on lists of endangered species and threatened species 
under the [ESA] shall have no force or effect”); Restoring State Wildlife Management Act of 
2010, S. Res. 3864, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (seeking “[t]o remove a portion of the distinct popula-
tion segment of the Rocky Mountain gray wolf from the list of threatened species or the list of 
endangered species”).  These are only two examples of the numerous bills that were introduced 
before the delisting rider was finally passed in 2011.  See, e.g., Delisting Gray Wolves to Restore 
State Management Act of 2011, S. Res. 231, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (seeking “[t]o provide for the 
status of the Northern Rocky Mountain distinct population segment of the gray wolf”).  For an 
excellent short summary discussion of this legislation, see, for example, Somerset Perry, Note, 
The Gray Wolf Delisting Rider and State Management Under the Endangered Species Act, 39 
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This legislation proved to be incredibly popular throughout the north-
ern Rocky Mountain states.205  As a result, it was strongly supported by 
federal legislators from these states, who soon found themselves in a sort of 
“arms race” of anti-wolf rhetoric, with individual legislators using their own 
delisting bills to establish their bona fides on the issue while focusing and 
amplifying opposition to the wolf’s continued listing in their constituen-
cies.206  Opponents of the wolf’s continued listing were then able to use 
both the threat of potentially successful legislative delisting, as well as the 
increasingly intense regional anti-wolf sentiment rallying behind this legis-
lation, to compel a favorable settlement with environmental groups who had 
previously succeeded in wolf-listing-related litigation.207  It would be easy 
to overlook this aspect of the legislation in light of the ultimate success of 
the wolf delisting appropriations rider discussed below.208  After all, even if 
the settlement had endured, it would have been superseded by the passage 
of the delisting rider.209  Overlooking this aspect of the legislation, howev-
er, is a mistake, for its success in compelling a favorable settlement may 
prove to be as significant a precedent as the delisting rider’s ultimate pas-
sage, at least with respect to the complicated patterns of negotiation and 
conflict between federal legislators, the listing agencies, interest groups, and 
local interests.210 
                                                          
ECOLOGY L.Q. 439 (2012).  For a partial list of the local and regional economic interests support-
ing this legislation, see, for example, Rehberg Bill to Delist Wolves Has Broad Support – In Con-
gress and Beyond, BIGGAMEFOREVER (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://biggameforever.org/blog/2011/02/14/rehberg-bill-to-delist-wolves-has-broad-support-
%E2%80%93-in-congress-and-beyond/ (summarizing support for wolf delisting legislation).  
 205.  See Ketcham, supra note 156 (discussing the delisting legislation and its approval among 
ranching and hunting advocates).   
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See, e.g., James William Gibson, Cry, Wolf: How a Campaign of Fear and Intimidation 
Led to the Gray Wolf’s Removal from the Endangered Species List, 26 EARTH ISLAND J. 34, 41 
(2011) (“Worried that Congress would pass one of the bills and set a dangerous precedent allow-
ing political intervention against any species listed as endangered,” most of “the national groups 
that had filed suit to protect the Rockies’ wolves” reached a settlement that “basically reversed” 
their hard-won litigation victories).  For a brief discussion of and citations to the relevant litiga-
tion, see supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.  The settlement itself was first set aside by 
the relevant federal court on April 9, 2011.  See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 776 F. Supp. 2d 
1178 (D. Mont. 2011).  Then it was superseded by the enactment of the wolf delisting rider on 
April 15, 2011.  See infra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.   
 208.  See infra notes 217–218. 
 209.  See infra note 214. 
 210.  Cf. infra notes 237–266 and accompanying text (discussing the political struggle over 
legislation exempting the dunes sagebrush lizard from the ESA); infra notes 280–302 and accom-
panying text (discussing similar struggles over exemption legislation for the lesser prairie-chicken 
and various salamanders); infra notes 341–361 and accompanying text (discussing the applicabil-
ity of game theory to the delisting debate) and accompanying text; see also Taylor, supra note 166 
(noting that the passage of the wolf delisting rider set a precedent, but that “probably more dis-
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In the end, none of the standalone species-specific bills targeting the 
wolf for delisting were enacted.211  Tearing a page out of a very old play-
book, however, in February 2011 federal legislators opposed to the wolf’s 
continued listing introduced an appropriations rider, which directed the Sec-
retary of the Interior to “reissue” one of FWS’s previously vacated rules 
delisting the gray wolf across most of its northern Rocky Mountain 
range.212  As with the previous standalone bills, the authors and supporters 
of the wolf delisting rider cited the alleged local and regional economic 
costs imposed by continued listing, while expressly disavowing any inten-
tion of amending the ESA’s general terms.213  Unlike the myriad standalone 
wolf delisting bills, this bipartisan rider survived, and on April 15 it was 
signed into law as part of the 2011 appropriations act.214  Indeed, at least in 
part because the rider was a bipartisan measure introduced during conten-
tious budgetary negotiations, it was passed virtually without debate or dis-
senting votes—a dramatic difference from the failure of similar legislation 
in 1987.215 
In June 2013, the FWS announced a proposed rule to delist the gray 
wolf entirely, with an opportunity for comment scheduled to run through 
mid-December 2013.216  Some preservationist groups have argued that 
FWS’s decision to remove protection for the gray wolf throughout the 
country was essentially made in 2010,217 when federal legislators represent-
                                                          
turbingly,” the wolf delisting legislation sends a signal that the ESA generally “is a bargaining 
chip”).   
 211.  See supra note 207. 
 212.  Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 150, § 1713 (2011).  The specific rule “reissue[d]” by this legislation 
was FWS’s April 2009 rule published at 74 Fed. Reg. 15123, which had been vacated by Defend-
ers of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010).  See supra notes 198–199 and 
accompanying text.  
 213.  E.g., Taylor, supra note 166 (discussing tension between legislators and environmental 
groups in reaction to delisting legislation). 
 214.  Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 150, § 1713 (2011).  Subsequent constitutional chal-
lenges raised by environmental groups were rejected by the Ninth Circuit.  Alliance for the Wild 
Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 215.  Cf. supra notes 166–174 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful species-
specific delisting amendments introduced in the House of Representatives in 1987).   
 216.  Removing the Gray Wolf (canis lupus) from the List of Endangered and Threatened  
Wildlife and Maintaining Protections for the Mexican Wolf (canis lupus baileyi) by Listing it as 
Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. 35664 (proposed June 13, 2013).  The proposed rule calls for maintain-
ing endangered species status for the Mexican wolf (canis lupus baileyi), which lives in the 
southwestern United States.  Id.   
 217.  See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Documents Reveal State Offi-
cials, Not Scientists, Led Decision To Strip Endangered Species Protection from Wolves Across 
Country (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2013/wolf-06-27-2013.html (arguing, 
based on documents obtained through FOIA requests and litigation, that the decision to delist the 
gray wolf throughout the country was made in August 2010).   
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ing northern Rocky Mountain states were introducing the delisting bills dis-
cussed above.218  These claims, and any potential link between the proposed 
delisting rule and the delisting legislation discussed here may well prove to 
be a useful subject for future work.  At the time of this writing, however, it 
seems premature, at best, to draw any direct connections between FWS’s 
proposed 2013 delisting decision for gray wolves generally and the delist-
ing legislation in 2010-2011 for gray wolves in the northern Rocky Moun-
tains.219 
C.  Derailing the Proposed Listing of the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard 
Although there was little opposition to the wolf delisting rider in Con-
gress, over a thousand scientists sent an open letter to the Senate protesting 
the wolf delisting legislation and claiming that it would set a dangerous 
precedent.220  These predictions, so similar to those raised in opposition to 
the species-specific delisting legislation that was defeated in 1987,221 would 
soon be proven prescient, as similar delisting or exemption legislation was 
rapidly introduced for other controversial species.222  The most significant 
example of this subsequent legislation, which will be discussed in detail in 
this Section, was introduced regarding the dunes sagebrush lizard. 
The dunes sagebrush lizard and the gray wolf have little in common—
aside from their central roles in the two most significant examples from the 
recent burst of delisting and exemption legislation.  Unlike the gray wolf, 
the dunes sagebrush lizard is not particularly well-known or charismatic; 
indeed, it was not even identified as a species until 1992.223  Also unlike the 
                                                          
 218.  See supra note 204. 
 219.  See supra notes 204, 216. 
 220.  Letter from 1,293 Scientists with Expertise in Biological Systems to the United States 
Senate Concerning Science and the Endangered Species Act (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/Experts-Letter-to-Senate-on-
Endangered-Species-Act-2011.pdf. 
Concerns about the dangerous precedent set by the wolf delisting rider were not limited to 
the scientific or even the broader academic community.  See, e.g., Editorial, A Hole in the Endan-
gered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at A22 (arguing that “the worst part” about the 
wolf delisting rider “is that it sets a terrible precedent—allowing Congress to decide the fate of 
animals on the list”); see also Michael Garrity, Op-Ed, Tester’s Wolf Rider Is Bad Policy, 
INDEPENDENT RECORD (Mar. 13, 2011, 12:00 AM) (arguing that the wolf delisting rider would 
gut the ESA and “open[] the door to others who can and will use similar riders to destroy our na-
tion’s bedrock environmental laws”).  
 221.  See supra Part II.A. 
 222.  See infra notes 235–241 and accompanying text. 
 223.  Species Profile for Dunes Sagebrush Lizard (Sceloporus arenicolus), U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., available at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=C03J (last visited Nov. 30, 
2013).  Terminological confusion also exists about its common name: sceloporus arenicolus is 
sometimes referred to as the “sand dune lizard” in both scientific literature and the popular press.  
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gray wolf, the dunes sagebrush lizard has evolved to accommodate a rela-
tively narrow habitat: it is considered a habitat specialist because it thrives 
only within the sand dunes around shinnery oaks in New Mexico and west 
Texas.224  According to opponents of the lizard’s potential listing, this habi-
tat is also critical to the economies of Texas, New Mexico, and the United 
States more generally, because it lies over the oil and gas of the Permian 
Basin.225  Concern over the potential economic impact of listing the lizard 
was not limited to oil and gas interests: representatives of cattle ranchers al-
so argued that ESA protection for the lizard would impose significant costs 
to their industry.226 
In 1995, the dunes sagebrush lizard was listed as endangered under 
New Mexico’s Wildlife Conservation Act.227  Then in 2001, the lizard was 
added to FWS’s list of ESA candidate species with a relatively high listing 
priority, an indication that FWS believed the lizard faced a relatively high 
risk of extinction.228  In 2004, following a listing petition and subsequent 
litigation with an environmental organization, FWS determined that the liz-
ard’s listing was warranted but precluded by higher listing priorities, and 
the species remained on the candidate list with the same listing priority.229  
In 2010, after considering another listing petition, FWS issued a proposed 
                                                          
Id.; see also Matthew Tresaugue, Sand Dunes Lizard Does Not Merit Protected Lists, U.S. Finds, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 13, 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Sand-
dunes-lizard-does-not-merit-protected-lists-3630741.php (describing recent legislation regarding 
the sagebrush lizard).  
 224.  Id.   
 225.  SUSAN COMBS, ENDANGERED ECONOMY: A CASE STUDY OF THE DUNES SAGEBRUSH 
LIZARD AND THE WEST TEXAS OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. 
ACCOUNTS (2012).  For a more detailed discussion of the potential oil reserves in the Permian 
Basin accessible from Texas and New Mexico, see, e.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RESERVE 
GROWTH ASSESSMENT FACT SHEET: ASSESSMENT OF REMAINING RECOVERABLE OIL IN 
SELECTED MAJOR OIL FIELDS OF THE PERMIAN BASIN, TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO  (2012), avail-
able at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3051/fs2012-3051.pdf.  
 226.  E.g., Joe Parker, Jr., Cattlemen’s Column: A Small Lizard with a Big Impact, THE 
CATTLEMAN UPDATE (July 7, 2011), 
http://tscra.org/news_blog/2011/07/07/cattlemen%E2%80%99s-column-a-small-lizard-with-a-big-
impact/#.UpqdSyeleVo (offering a rancher’s perspective of the possible harm posed by listing the 
sagebrush lizard to the cattle industry). 
 227.  N.M. DEPT. OF GAME & FISH, THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES OF NEW 
MEXICO (2008), available at 
http://www.wildlife.state.nm.us/conservation/threatened_endangered_species/documents/2008Bie
nnialReview.pdf. 
 228.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Plant and Animal Species 
That are Candidates or Proposed for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, Annual Notice of Find-
ings or Recycled Petitions, and Annual Description of Progress and Listing Actions, 66 Fed. Reg. 
54,808, 54811 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
 229.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife Plants; 12-Month Findings on Resubmitted Peti-
tions to List the Southern Idaho Ground Squirrel, Sand Dune Lizard, and Tahoe Yellow Cress, 69 
Fed. Reg. 77167, 77172 (Dec. 27, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
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rule listing the lizard as endangered.230  In the proposed rule, FWS noted 
several specific threats to the lizard’s habitat and continued survival, partic-
ularly activities related to the energy industry, including drilling activity, 
seismic exploration, and the installation of infrastructure needed for oil and 
gas development.231 
The reaction to the dunes sagebrush lizard’s proposed listing was 
swift, dramatic, and marked by substantial opposition.232  Industry groups 
helped organize much of the initial opposition, which tended to revolve 
around the local public hearings FWS was required to hold regarding the 
proposed listing.233  As with the battle over the gray wolf, federal legislators 
from Texas and New Mexico soon became involved in the struggle against 
the proposed listing in ways that would demonstrate the prescience of the 
concerns raised during passage of the wolf delisting rider.234 
In June 2011, following the successful example set just a few short 
months earlier during the struggle over the gray wolf, a federal legislator 
from Texas proposed an amendment to an otherwise unrelated economic 
development act seeking to exempt the lizard from the ESA.235  In discuss-
                                                          
 230.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for Dunes Sagebrush 
Lizard, 75 Fed. Reg. 77801, 77813 (Dec. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 231.  Id. at 77805–07.  The proposed rule also identified additional threats to the lizard’s habi-
tat related to wind and solar energy development, as well as grazing activities.  Id. at 77807–09. 
 232.  Public reaction to the proposed listing, however, was not entirely negative.  See, e.g., 
Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Protection Petition Surges Past 7,000 Signatures 
(Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2011/dunes-
sagebrush-lizard-11-01-2011.html (reporting on the progress of an environmentalist sponsored 
petition). 
 233.  E.g., Monica Tassoni, PBPA Holds Rally To Prevent Listing Local Lizard on Endangered 
List, PERMIANBASIN360.COM (Apr. 26, 2011, 11:55 PM), 
http://permianbasin360.com/fulltext?nxd_id=106467.  “PBPA” is the acronym for the Permian 
Basin Petroleum Association.  About, PERMIAN BASIN PETROLEUM  ASS’N, 
http://pbpa.info/sample-page/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
 234.  See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 235.  S. Amdt. 397 to S. 782, 112th Cong. (June 7, 2011) (amending Section 4 of the ESA by 
adding the phrase “[t]his Act shall not apply to the sand dune lizard”).  The amendment was filed 
in the Senate but not offered, and therefore neither voted on nor enacted.  Although Senator 
Cornyn’s effort to exempt the lizard from the listing process received the most attention, other 
federal legislators also made similar efforts.  For example, in an April 2011 letter to the relevant 
Appropriations Committee and Subcommittee chairs—just as the wolf delisting rider was being 
signed into law—several representatives proposed an appropriations amendment that would strip 
funding for any listing activity for both the “Sand Dune Lizard” and the lesser prairie chicken.  
Letter from Representatives Steve Pearce, Randy Neugebauer, Michael Conaway, and Francisco 
Canseco to Representatives Hal Rogers and Michael K. Simpson (Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://wg.convio.net/site/DocServer/Cong_l_Listing_Defunding_Letter-
Pearce_April_2011.pdf?docID=2442&autologin=true&AddInterest=1059.  Representative Simp-
son, of course, had introduced the wolf delisting bill in the House.  For a good short discussion of 
this proposed appropriations amendment, see Phil Taylor, Enviros, GOP Lawmakers Square Off 
Over Plan to Block Southwest Endangered Species Listings, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, 
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ing the legislation, the legislator and his aides specifically pointed to the 
gray wolf delisting legislation as a precedent for their proposed legisla-
tion.236  As with the gray wolf delisting legislation, the lizard exemption 
amendment was specifically designed to address the potential economic 
costs of listing the lizard, especially the potential costs to oil and gas inter-
ests in the Permian Basin.237  Accordingly, as with the wolf delisting legis-
lation, the lizard exemption amendment also received substantial support 
from industry groups, particularly from oil and gas interests.238 
At the same time, the lizard exemption legislation also attracted sub-
stantial opposition from environmental groups who argued that the alleged 
local and regional costs of listing the lizard were being exaggerated.239  
Many of these groups also expressed concern that the lizard exemption bill, 
inspired by the wolf delisting legislation, represented a new and dangerous 
front in the listing wars.240  Moreover, at least initially, the lizard exemption 
legislation also attracted opposition from FWS officials, who pointed out 
that such a legislative effort to preemptively halt the listing of a species was 
something novel in the history of ESA conflicts and a substantial extension 
of any precedent set by the gray wolf delisting legislation.241 
These concerns were not shared by many state or local officials in 
Texas or New Mexico.  While opposition to the potential listing took many 
                                                          
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/06/06greenwire-enviros-gop-lawmakers-square-off-over-
plan-to-b-3539.html?pagewanted=all.   
 236.  Paul Wiseman, Cornyn Amendment Would Halt Lizard Listing, MIDLAND REPORTER-
TELEGRAM, June 7, 2011, http://www.mrt.com/top_stories/article_4c600298-585a-5765-9ab5-
c63d4e6ce716.html?mode=story.  
 237.  See, e.g., id. (noting one of Cornyn’s aides claimed the amendment was introduced “be-
cause keeping the sand dune lizard off the endangered species list is considered economically 
sound”); see also Emily Miller, Editorial, A Reptile Messes with Texas, WASHINGTON TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/25/a-reptile-messes-with-texas/ 
(quoting Cornyn’s argument that since there has not been a cost-benefit analysis, we shouldn’t 
“elevate this little lizard” above people and their welfare and jobs); April Reese, FWS Predicts 
Little Disruption from Possible Sagebrush Lizard Listing, E&E PUBL’G (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/media-archive/a2012/SagebrushListing_EandENews_11-
3-11.pdf (quoting Representative Pearce, who argued that “[d]uring these difficult economic 
times, we cannot afford to needlessly sacrifice even a single job”).  
 238.  See, e.g., id. (quoting the president of the Permian Basin Petroleum Association).   
 239.  E.g., Bolstad, supra note 156 (quoting representatives from the Center for Biological Di-
versity and WildEarth Guardians).   
 240.  Id. 
 241.  See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 235 (quoting Dan Ashe, then Director-designate of FWS, 
who stated that “[l]isting decisions should be based on the science,” that if a species “meets the 
statutory criteria of endangered or threatened, it should be added to the list,” and that he was “not 
aware of any administration that has taken the position that Congress should get involved in the 
question of list or not list a species”); see also Reese, supra note 237 (quoting FWS spokesman 
Tom Buckley, who claimed that the impact of listing on industry would be small, blamed opposi-
tion to the listing on “misinformation,” and stated that “there’s a lot of political pressure to either 
extend or make a non listing decision, but we have to follow what the science tells us”).   
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forms,242 many state and local officials echoed federal legislators’ calls for a 
specific exemption from listing for the lizard.243  In this exceptionally polar-
ized environment, even substantial efforts to obstruct or minimize the im-
pact of the lizard’s potential listing were attacked if they were perceived to 
fall short of total exemption for the lizard from the ESA.244  With concern 
about the potential listing boiling to a fever pitch, in the summer and fall of 
2011 many of the federal legislators involved in the exemption legislation 
repeatedly urged FWS to extend its consideration of the potential listing.245  
At the same time, concerned representatives of environmental groups noted 
that federal legislators and industry representatives opposed to the lizard’s 
listing were putting enormous amounts of pressure on FWS, threatening the 
integrity of the listing process.246 
On December 5, 2011, FWS announced a six-month extension on its 
decision and a re-opening of the comment period.247  Opponents of the liz-
ard’s potential listing seized this opportunity to amass and disseminate ad-
ditional allegations about the potential costs of listing the lizard.248  In 
March 2012, congressional opponents of the lizard’s listing submitted an-
other amendment to exempt the lizard from listing under the ESA,249 which, 
                                                          
 242.  E.g., Nick Lawton, City of Midland Prepared to Sue over Lizard Listing, NEWSWEST 9 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://pbpa.info/city-of-midland-prepared-to-sue-over-lizard-listing/ (quoting 
Midland Mayor Wes Perry). 
 243.  See, e.g., Kel Seliger, Endangered Species Act and the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Endan-
ger Our Economy, MIDLAND-REPORTER TELEGRAM, Nov. 16, 2011, 
http://www.mywesttexas.com/business/oil/top_stories/article_77cf0cf6-10a9-11e1-88ee-
001cc4c002e0.html (arguing for an exemption to the ESA for the dunes sagebrush lizard); see also 
H.R. 1955 82d (R) Sess. (Tex. 2011) (urging withdrawal of the proposed listing of the dunes 
sagebrush lizard and calling for statements about its economic impact to be read into the Congres-
sional record).  
 244.  See, e.g., Robert Guaderrama, Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Conservation Plan Is a Safety 
Net, CBS 7 (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.cbs7kosa.com/news/details.asp?ID=29097 (quoting crit-
ics of Texas Comptroller Susan Combs, who claimed her opposition to the lizard’s listing was 
“not enough”).  Criticism of Combs’s alleged moderation on listing issues is a striking example of 
the super-charged environment that the lizard exemption legislation helped create, for Combs’s 
office maintains specific websites tracking potential listings and their alleged potential economic 
impact called “Keeping Texas First.”  Combs would subsequently claim a substantial degree of 
credit for the ultimate prevention of the lizard’s listing. 
 245.  Gabriella Lopez, Lizard Letter Hits Legislative Dead End, OA ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2011, 
12:00 AM), http://www.oaoa.com/article_988a0ae0-ff3f-5c0b-abae-f16c60edbe63.html.   
 246.  Phil Taylor, Endangered Species: Cornyn Urges More Time Before Lizard Listing, PBPA 
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://pbpa.info/endangered-species-cornyn-urges-more-time-before-lizard-
listing-tuesday-october-25-2011/ (quoting Taylor McKinnon, public lands campaign director for 
the Center for Biological Diversity).   
 247.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 6-Month Extension of Final Determina-
tion for the Proposed Listing of the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard as Endangered, 76 Fed. Reg. 75858 
(Dec. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
 248.  See supra note 243. 
 249.  S. Amdt. 1978 to S. 2204, 112th Cong. (Mar. 28, 2012).  Senate Amendment 1978 was 
introduced by Senator Cornyn, but other federal legislators also reiterated their 2011 calls for the 
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in turn, provided another feedback loop to echo and amplify local and re-
gional concerns about the alleged costs of the proposed listing.250  At the 
same time, state and local opponents of the lizard’s listing continued to 
challenge FWS’s findings regarding the threats to the lizard’s continued 
survival, while preparing additional state and local conservation plans for 
the lizard involving private landowners.251 
In June 2012, at the conclusion of the six-month extension, FWS with-
drew its proposed rule to list the lizard, citing new studies funded by energy 
interests and submitted during the reopened comment period, as well as 
new candidate conservation agreements put in place since the proposed list-
ing.252  Opponents of the lizard’s listing, including the architects of the ex-
emption legislation, were delighted,253 as were representatives of industry 
                                                          
lizard to be entirely exempted from the listing process across all or part of its range.  See, e.g., Mi-
lan Simonich, Coalition Against Lizard Crumbles, Pearce Continues Fight, DAILY TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2012, http://www.daily-times.com/ci_20465708/coalition-against-lizard-crumbles-pearce-
continues-fight (describing Representative Pearce’s continued attempts to gather Congressional 
support for a measure similar to the gray wolf delisting bill).  
 250.  See, e.g., Cornyn Tries to Keep Lizard off Endangered List, CBS DFW (Mar. 28, 2012, 
1:30 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2012/03/28/cornyn-tries-to-keep-lizard-off-endangered-list/ 
(“Echoing oil and natural gas producers throughout the Permian Basin, Cornyn says listing the 
species could bring production in parts of West Texas and southeastern New Mexico to ‘a 
screeching halt.’”).  
 251.  For a discussion of how the conservation plans evolved during this time period, see Ter-
rence Henry, How the Conservation Plan for the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Works, NPR 
STATEIMPACT (June 15, 2012, 12:28 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/06/15/how-the-
conservation-plan-for-the-dunes-sagebrush-lizard-works (interviewing Dr. Benjamin Tuggle, 
Southwest Director for FWS).   
 252.  See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List 
Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,872, 36,898 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pt. 17) (“Since the time of our proposed listing, there have been many efforts to develop conserva-
tion measures for the dunes sagebrush lizard . . . .  These efforts have reduced or eliminated 
threats to the dunes sagebrush lizard.”).  For an explanation of candidate conservation agreements 
and short discussion of their history, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.   
Comptroller Combs credited Senator Cornyn, the chief proponent of lizard exemption legis-
lation in Congress, with obtaining the critical extension from FWS.  Kate Galbraith, Combs, Oil 
Groups Laud Federal Decision on Lizard, TEXAS TRIBUNE, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/06/13/texas-oil-groups-applaud-key-lizard-decision/.   
 253.  Among federal legislators who had supported lizard exemption legislation, Representa-
tive Pearce called the decision “a huge victory for the people who have tirelessly fought to save 
regional jobs and our way of life.”  Stephen Dinan, White House Retreats on Endangered Species 
Protection for Lizard, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 13, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/13/white-house-retreats-on-endangered-species-
protect/?page=all (quoting Pearce).  Representative Neugebauer hailed the decision as avoiding 
“devastation [to] our local economy,” and Senator Cornyn promised to “continue to work to pre-
vent ill-conceived listing proposals like this one that . . . threaten Texas jobs.”  Cole Shooter, Tex-
as Officeholders Weigh In on Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Ruling, KFYO (June 13, 2012, 4:19 PM), 
http://kfyo.com/texas-officeholders-weigh-in-on-dunes-sagebrush-lizard-ruling/ (quoting 
Neugebauer and Cornyn). 
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groups concerned about the listing’s potential local and regional costs.254  
The reaction from the environmental community was much more mixed: 
representatives of some environmental groups called the decision a cost-
effective measure that provided some lizard protection,255 but many others 
attacked it as a politically orchestrated collapse that set a dangerous prece-
dent while leaving the lizard unprotected.256  Criticism of the decision has 
not been limited to concerns about the ultimate survival of the lizard.  Some 
are concerned that the implementation of the compromise measures, with 
industry representatives presently playing a leading role in supervising liz-
ard conservation efforts, fails even minimal tests of accountability and 
transparency.257 
All sides agreed that the decision, like the wolf delisting rider, repre-
sented something truly novel in the history of listing conflicts.258  For some, 
the process and decision were unprecedented because of the scope and po-
tential efficacy of the voluntary conservation efforts involved;259 for others, 
the process and decision represented an unprecedented capitulation to eco-
nomic interests and another dangerous precedent for future listings.260  Be-
yond these competing claims, the listing battles over the dunes sagebrush 
lizard also highlights how useful species-specific exemption legislation can 
be for critics of the ESA and opponents of a particular listing.261  Whether 
by design, accident, or some combination thereof, the exemption legislation 
                                                          
 254.  E.g., Gabriella Lopez, Basin Businesses Pleased with Lizard Decision, OA ONLINE (June 
13, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.oaoa.com/news/government/article_942b2060-9346-57d6-
8e00-66b4a8d17d9e.html.  
 255.  See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 252 (quoting David Festa, a representative of the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, who claimed the decision is cost effective, benefits wildlife, and re-
spects landowners).   
 256.  See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Rare Lizard Is Protected, but Fails Endangered Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 2012, at A20 (quoting Taylor McKinnon, a representative of the Center for Bio-
logical Diversity, who argued that “[b]y caving to the oil and gas industry, the Obama administra-
tion is doing wrong by this rare lizard, it’s ignoring science and it’s setting a dangerous precedent 
for other species”); see also Mark Salvo, Feds Deny Protection to Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 
WILDEARTH GUARDIANS (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7711 (“Biologically, there 
is no species more deserving of listing than the dunes sagebrush lizard.”).   
 257.  See Editorial, Lizards and Weasels: If We’re Not Going To Protect a Texas Species, Let’s 
at Least Not Pretend that We Are, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 10, 2013, at B11 (“Texas 
shouldn’t be a state that pussyfoots around, hiding sneaky lobbyist-fueled actions from the people.  
If we say we’re going to protect lizards, we should protect lizards . . . . [a]nd if we’re not going to 
protect lizards, let’s at least have the decency not to pretend that we are.”). 
 258.  For example, Secretary Salazar called the process “a great example” for states and land-
owners to follow “before a species is listed.”  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LANDMARK 
CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS KEEP DUNES SAGEBRUSH LIZARD OFF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
LIST IN NM, TX (2012).   
 259.  Id.  
 260.  E.g., Fernandez, supra note 256. 
 261.  See supra notes 252–253 and accompanying text. 
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provided a focus and an amplifier for claims about the alleged local costs of 
listing, which helped build and intensify local opposition to the listing.262  
The legislation also served as an anchor for opponents of the listing, allow-
ing industry and legislative critics of the cost of listing to voice concern that 
potential compromise efforts were going too far.263 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the repeated introduction of 
this legislation forced FWS and other listing advocates to confront a novel 
and stark choice.  Without compromise, first in the form of delay and later 
in the form of the final determination not to list the lizard, the species might 
be stripped of all possibility of protection through exemption or delisting 
legislation.  Of course, all of these traits can also be seen in the story of the 
gray wolf delisting legislation,264 but the ultimate success of the gray wolf 
delisting rider may obscure what the dunes sagebrush lizard’s story illumi-
nates: species-specific exemption legislation can play a major role in derail-
ing a potential listing even if it is not enacted into law.265  The story of the 
dunes sagebrush lizard and its potential listing is not over, however.  In 
June 2013, two biodiversity nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) filed 
suit to challenge the withdrawal of the lizard arguing, inter alia, that the 
voluntary conservation agreements to protect the lizard in Texas are inade-
quate and that FWS’s related decision not to list the lizard violated the stat-
utory standards for listing decisions.266  In October 2013, the Texas Comp-
troller’s motion to intervene in the lawsuit was granted.267  Obviously, the 
result of this litigation will likely be quite significant to the ultimate impact 
of future species-specific exemption and delisting legislation.  At present, 
however, the dunes sagebrush lizard provides a highly salient example of 
the apparent initial success that such legislation can have as part of a threat-
and-compel negotiation process with the listing agencies, even if it is not 
enacted. 
                                                          
 262.  See supra notes 253–255.  
 263.  See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 264.  See supra notes 205–210 and accompanying text.  
 265.  The reasons why species-specific delisting or exemption legislation have proven to be 
such a versatile and successful tool for critics of the conventional understanding of the ESA will 
be discussed in much greater detail in Part IV, infra.   
 266.  Complaint at 12–16, Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, No. 1:13-cv-00919 (D.D.C. June 
19, 2013), available at http://esawatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/130618-Defenders-CBD-
v-Ashe-Complaint-re-DunesSagebrushLizard.pdf. 
 267.  Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, No. 1:13-cv-00919 (D.D.C. OCT. 24, 2013) (order grant-
ing motion to intervene), available at http://esawatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Order-
Granting-Intervention.pdf.  For a discussion of Comptroller Combs’s interactions with the legisla-
tors who drafted the lizard delisting legislation, as well has her role in the agreement with FWS 
that prevented the lizard’s listing, see supra notes 244, 252. 
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D.  Additional Recent Delisting and Exemption Legislation 
The delisting and exemption efforts directed at the gray wolf and the 
dunes sagebrush lizard are only the most significant examples of the recent 
delisting and exemption legislation.  As this Section will show, this recent 
burst of species-specific delisting and exemption has spread across the 
country—in other words, it would be simply incorrect to dismiss it as a 
simply a regional phenomenon.  Moreover, this burst of legislative activity 
shows no real sign of abating, as several delisting and exemption efforts 
have only recently begun.  Indeed, as Part IV will show, the underlying 
causes of the recent burst of species-specific delisting and exemption legis-
lation are structural, not merely political; and similar legislation will likely 
continue to emerge unless these causes are addressed.  Finally, the recent 
delisting and exemption legislation is not always successful even as a tool 
for negotiation, as at least one of the final examples discussed here may 
show. 
1.  The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna 
The recent exemption legislation introduced by opponents of the po-
tential listing of the Atlantic bluefin tuna provides the best evidence for the 
national appeal of the recent burst of delisting and exemption legislation.268  
The Atlantic bluefin tuna is a large, wide-ranging, and well-known spe-
cies,269 with both substantial present commercial value and widespread cul-
tural significance.270  Commercial interest in the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
stretches even beyond its vast historic range—in fact, the western Atlantic 
stock of bluefin tuna is heavily fished by Japan, as well as Canada and the 
United States.271  The species’s wide range, and the even wider dispersion 
of commercial interests with a stake in harvesting the tuna, mean that man-
aging declining bluefin tuna stocks involves many tricky issues of political 
                                                          
 268.  The bluefin tuna exemption legislation is the best, but not the only, example of the geo-
graphic diversity of recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation.  See, e.g., supra 
note 156 and accompanying text (showing the issues facing the delisting and exemption legisla-
tion for wolves). 
 269.  There are three species of bluefin tuna. All references here, unless otherwise specified, 
are to the Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnis).  See Bluefin Tuna, WORLD WILDLIFE 
FOUNDATION, http://worldwildlife.org/species/bluefin-tuna (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).  
 270.  Today, claims about the economic significance of bluefin tuna, or defenses of current 
levels of its consumption, are often intertwined with its consumption and economic significance.  
See, e.g., Paul Greenberg, Tuna’s End, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/magazine/27Tuna-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing 
arguments and criticism of continued consumption of bluefin tuna based in part on its cultural sig-
nificance).   
 271.  Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, NOAA FISHERIES, 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/stories/2011/05/bluefin_tuna.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
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scale.272  On May 24, 2010, NMFS received a petition from the Center for 
Biological Diversity to list the Atlantic bluefin as endangered under the 
ESA.273  On September 21, 2010, NMFS published its 90-day finding that 
listing might be warranted and convened a team of experts to review the tu-
na’s status and existing threats.274 
Concern about listing the bluefin tuna ran high in states with substan-
tial fishing industries, and federal legislators of both parties soon began 
voicing their opposition, citing the negative impact that listing the tuna 
would have on local economies.275  This opposition was converted into spe-
cies-specific exemption legislation almost as soon as the gray wolf delisting 
legislation was enacted; more specifically, in May 2011, just weeks after 
the gray wolf delisting legislation was enacted, a federal legislator from 
New Hampshire introduced a measure to exempt the Atlantic bluefin tuna 
from the ESA, titled the Bluefin Tuna Fisherman Employment Preservation 
Act.276  Just a few short weeks after the introduction of this tuna exemption 
legislation, NMFS announced its decision that listing the tuna was not war-
ranted.277  As a result of this compressed timeline, it is difficult to assess 
what role, if any, the proposed tuna exemption legislation might have 
played if the process had been prolonged.  The introduction of the tuna ex-
emption legislation, however, demonstrates that the recent burst of species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation cannot be dismissed as a purely 
regional phenomenon.278 
                                                          
 272.  See Dawn M. Kato, Battle for Bluefin: The Consumer’s Role in Preserving the Atlantic 
Bluefin Tuna, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 149, 160 (2011) (noting political restraints on international 
regulation and protection of bluefin tuna and the difficulty of political compromise with so many 
nations’ differing interests). 
 273.  See Endangered Species Act Listing Determination for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 31556 (proposed June 1, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223, 224) (detailing history of 
listing determination).   
 274.  90 Day Finding on a Petition to List Atlantic Bluefin Tuna as Threatened or Endangered 
under the Endangered Species Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 57431 (proposed Sept. 21, 2010) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223, 224).   
 275.  E.g., Feds Hear Maine Fishermen’s Concerns About Tuna Listing, THE MAINE PUBLIC 
BROADCASTING NETWORK, (Jan. 7, 2011, 3:32 PM), 
http://www.mpbn.net/News/MaineHeadlineNews/tabid/968/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3479/ItemId/14769
/Default.aspx.  Opponents of the tuna’s listing also argued that it was unfair to penalize U.S. fish-
ing interests when any peril to the tuna’s continued existence was largely due to the conduct of 
fishing interests in other countries.  Id. 
 276.  H.R. 1806, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (proposal amending Section 4 of the ESA to include the 
provision that “[t]he Bluefin tuna may not be treated as an endangered species or threatened spe-
cies”).   
 277.  Endangered Species Act Listing Determination for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 76 Fed. Reg. 
31556 (proposed June 1, 2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223, 224). 
 278.  Id.   
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2.  The Lesser Prairie-Chicken and the Edwards Aquifer 
Salamanders 
As will be shown in Part IV, there is no reason to believe that the fun-
damental causes behind the recent burst of species-specific delisting and 
exemption legislation have run their course, which means that other species 
will likely soon be targeted by such legislation in the near future.279  Before 
examining the ongoing structural forces driving this legislation in Part IV, 
this Section will briefly describe some additional species that have already 
been targeted by such legislation in ways that are broadly similar to the con-
flicts over the gray wolf and the dunes sagebrush lizard. 
The first such species, the lesser prairie-chicken, is a grassland bird 
that lives in parts of Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma, as well as many of 
the counties in New Mexico and Texas where the dunes sagebrush lizard is 
found.280  The lesser prairie-chicken has been a candidate for listing since 
1998 when FWS, responding to a petition, found that listing the species was 
warranted but precluded.281  In December 2008, in its annual candidate no-
tice of review for the lesser prairie-chicken, FWS noted that it had decided 
to substantially increase the lesser prairie-chicken’s listing priority number, 
citing an anticipated increase in energy development throughout the chick-
en’s range.282  Wind towers, transmission lines, and drilling rigs pose a 
problem for the lesser prairie-chicken because they provide perching sites 
for the bird’s predators.283  Accordingly, the lesser prairie-chicken’s poten-
tial listing has attracted opposition similar to that faced by the dunes sage-
brush lizard.284 
                                                          
 279.  See infra Part IV. 
 280.  Listing the Lesser Prairie-Chicken as a Threatened Species, 77 Fed. Reg. 73828 (pro-
posed Dec. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); see also Species Profile: Lesser Prairie-
Chicken (Tympanuchus pallidicinctus), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=B0AZ (last visited Nov. 
30, 2013). 
 281.  12-Month Finding for a Petition to List the Lesser Prairie-Chicken as Threatened and 
Designate Critical Habitat, 63 Fed. Reg. 31400 (proposed June 9, 1998) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17).   
 282.  Review of Native Species That Are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, 
73 Fed. Reg. 75176 (proposed Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
 283.  Kate Galbraith, Texas Energy Industry Could Be Stymied by Small Grouse, TEXAS 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2013, http://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/14/texas-energy-industry-could-be-
stymied-small-grous/. 
 284.  See, e.g., Ros Krasny, Lawmakers Cry ‘Fowl’ Over Move to Help Lesser Prairie Chick-
en, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 30, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-
30/business/sns-rt-us-endangered-prairie-chickenbre8at1e3-20121130_1_prairie-chicken-
wildearth-guardians-lesser-prairie (quoting federal legislators who attacked the local “permanent 
economic consequences” including driving “ranching families and energy producers out of busi-
ness”).   
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In June 2011, barely a month after the gray wolf delisting rider was 
enacted, federal legislators introduced the first piece of legislation attempt-
ing to specifically exempt the lesser prairie-chicken from the ESA, even 
though the species had not yet been proposed for listing.285  In July 2012, 
one month after the announcement that the dunes sagebrush lizard would 
not be listed, over twenty federal legislators sent a letter to the Director of 
FWS urging that the lesser prairie-chicken not be listed. 286  At this time, 
these federal legislators also announced that the director of FWS had as-
sured them that the “right ingredients” were in place for a compromise on 
the lesser prairie-chicken similar to the compromise reached on the dunes 
sagebrush lizard—even though, in early 2012, the director of FWS had pre-
viously suggested that listing the prairie-chicken was quite likely.287  In De-
cember 2012, FWS issued a proposed rule listing the prairie-chicken as 
threatened, and local hearings began in the affected areas in early 2013.288  
As in the case of the dunes sagebrush lizard, federal legislators have already 
begun using the prospect of a species-specific legislative exemption for the 
lesser prairie-chicken to galvanize and focus local and state opposition to 
the proposed listing.289  On June 13, 2013, several federal legislators wrote 
a letter to the director of FWS requesting a six-month delay in the final list-
                                                          
 285.  This initial lesser prairie-chicken exemption legislation was introduced as an amendment 
to an otherwise unrelated piece of legislation, the Economic Revitalization Act of 2011. CONG. 
REC. S3627 (daily ed. June 8, 2011) (Rep. Inhofe proposed SA 429 to S. 782).  
 286.  Letter from Sen. James Inhofe, S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, to Fish and Wildlife 
Serv. Director Dan M. Ashe (July 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=29920292-
6268-4863-b2ea-c6328b3fe7dd.  
 287.  E.g., Phil Taylor, Interior Punts Chicken Listing to After Elections, E&E PUBL’G (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970552/print.  What changed between January and 
July 2012?  The compellent threat of species-specific exemption legislation was far more credible 
in July 2012 because in January 2012, federal legislators, their state and local counterparts, and 
industry representatives had not yet succeeded in derailing the proposed listing of the dunes sage-
brush lizard.   
 288.  Listing the Lesser Prairie-Chicken as a Threatened Species, 77 Fed. Reg. 73828 (pro-
posed Dec. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  In late February 2013, Senator Inhofe 
and other federal legislators asked for an extension of the comment period for this proposed list-
ing, which FWS granted in early March.  E.g., Press Release, Senator John M. Inhofe, Inhofe Ap-
plauds FWS Decision to Grant Extension on Lesser Prairie Chicken Listing (Mar. 4, 2013).  
 289.  E.g., Milan Simonich, House Weighs in Against Listing of Lesser Prairie Chicken, LAS 
CRUCES SUN-NEWS, Feb. 12, 2013, http://www.lcsun-news.com/ci_22576811/house-weighs-
against-listing-lesser-prairie-chicken; Adam D. Young, Hundreds Flock to Lesser Prairie-Chicken 
Public Hearing, LUBBOCKONLINE.COM (Feb. 12, 2013, 12:34 AM), 
http://lubbockonline.com/regional/2013-02-11/hundreds-flock-lesser-prairie-chicken-public-
hearing#.Upq-oieleVo.  The resolution in New Mexico’s House of Representatives was allegedly 
the idea of federal Congressman Steve Pearce, who led a local rally against the proposed listing on 
the same day that the resolution was introduced.  Simonich, supra note 249.  Representative 
Pearce was, of course, one of the federal legislators who strongly supported exemption legislation 
for the dunes sagebrush lizard.  See supra note 237.   
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ing decision.290  FWS announced a six-month extension for its final deci-
sion regarding the lesser prairie-chicken’s proposed listing in July 2013.291  
In October 2013, FWS issued a news release endorsing a regional conserva-
tion plan developed by Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Colo-
rado.292  The plan was also endorsed by many of the federal legislators who 
introduced exemption legislation for either or both of the dunes sagebrush 
lizard or the lesser prairie-chicken,293 and criticized by some NGOs who 
compared it to the plan approved for the dunes sagebrush lizard.294  The 
listing decision on the lesser prairie-chicken is expected in March 2014. 
The situation of four species of salamanders in central Texas provides 
a final example of recent species-specific exemption legislation, albeit tied 
to at least some species that have ultimately been listed.  On August 22, 
2012, FWS issued a proposed rule listing the Austin blind salamander, the 
Jollyville Plateau salamander, the Georgetown salamander, and the Salado 
salamander as endangered under the ESA.295  The proposed listing of these 
four salamanders has generated substantial local opposition very similar to 
the opposition generated in earlier debates about the Barton Springs sala-
mander, a species that helped spark intense battles over the ESA in the 
                                                          
 290.  E.g., Senate Looking To Extend Lesser Prairie Chicken Decision, PORTALES NEWS-
TRIBUNE, June 16, 2013, http://www.pntonline.com/2013/06/16/senate-looking-to-extend-lesser-
prairie-chicken-decision/. 
 291.  6-Month Extension of Final Determination for the Proposed Listing of the Lesser Prairie-
Chicken as a Threatened Species, 78 Fed. Reg. 41022 (proposed July 9, 2013) (to be codified at 
50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 292.  News Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Endorses 
Western Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies Lesser Prairie-Chicken Range-Wide Conser-
vation Plan (Oct. 2013).  
 293.  See, e.g., Matthew Reichbach, Lesser Prairie Chicken Plan Welcomed by Udall, Pearce; 
Condemned by Enviro Group, NEW MEXICO TELEGRAM (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nmtelegram.com/2013/10/23/lesser-prairie-chicken-plan-welcomed-by-udall-pearce-
condemned-by-enviro-group/ (quoting Representative Pearce’s claim that “[s]ince we can all 
agree to the strength and effectiveness of the five-state Range Wide Plan, a listing under the 
[ESA] is clearly an unnecessary measure that would have a detrimental impact on our local econ-
omies”); Press Release, Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Neugebauer Statement on FWS Endorsement of 
States’ Lesser Prairie-Chicken Conservation Plan (Oct. 23, 2013), available at 
http://randy.house.gov/press-release/neugebauer-statement-fws-endorsement-states’-lesser-prairie-
chicken-conservation-plan (endorsing “[t]he Range-Wide Conservation Plan” as “an innovative 
collaboration that allows states, landowners, farmers, ranchers and energy producers to work to-
gether”). 
 294.  See, e.g., Kate Sheppard, Chevron and ALEC Take on the Big, Bad Lesser Prairie Chick-
en, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/04/chevron-alec-
endangered-species-act_n_4380392.html (interviewing Jay Lininger at the Center for Biological 
Diversity who “compared the lesser prairie chicken’s plight to that of the dunes sagebrush liz-
ard”).   
 295.  Endangered Status for Four Central Texas Salamanders and Designation of Critical Habi-
tat, 77 Fed. Reg. 50768 (proposed Aug. 22, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
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1990s.296  As with the Barton Springs salamander, opposition to the pro-
posed listings is rooted in their alleged local economic impact.297 
In July 2012, shortly before FWS issued its proposed rule, federal leg-
islators representing Texas introduced the Salamander Community Conser-
vation Act, a species-specific exemption bill almost identical to examples 
discussed previously in this Article.298  While this legislation has also not 
yet been enacted, as with the dunes sagebrush lizard exemption legislation, 
it provides yet another example of the ways in which federal legislators can 
use species-specific exemption legislation as a compellent threat in negotia-
tions with FWS.  For example, at one of FWS’s local hearings regarding the 
proposed salamanders listing, the author of the House salamander exemp-
tion bill received a round of applause when he announced that he was still 
“trying to be a cooperative member of Congress,” while noting that if coop-
eration failed, “I can also be an uncooperative member of [C]ongress.”299  
In late June 2013, federal legislators sent a letter to FWS requesting a six-
month extension on the proposed listing of the salamander species.300  In 
August 2013, FWS announced the listing of the Austin blind and Jollyville 
Plateau salamanders, as well as a six-month extension of the final determi-
nations for the Georgetown and Salado salamanders.301 
                                                          
 296.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text.   
 297.  Olivia Gordon, Saving the Salamanders: Conservation vs. Development, NPR 
STATEIMPACT (July 27, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/07/27/saving-the-
salamanders-conservation-vs-development/ (noting the connection between habitats and the oppo-
sition to the listed Barton Springs salamander and the listing candidate salamander species). 
 298.  Salamander Community Conservation Act, H.R. 6219, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012); S. 3446, 
112th Cong. § 2 (2012) (“Section 4(a) [of the ESA] shall not apply to (1) the Austin blind sala-
mander; (2) the Georgetown salamander; (3) the Jollyville Plateau salamander; or (4) the Salado 
salamander.”).  The similarity between these bills and other examples of delisting or exemption 
legislation should not be surprising—Senator Cornyn introduced the Senate version of this bill as 
well as much of the dunes sagebrush lizard exemption legislation.  
 299.  Mose Buchele, Why the Fight over Salamanders in Texas Is Only Just Beginning, NPR 
STATEIMPACT (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/09/10/why-the-
fight-over-salamanders-in-texas-is-only-just-beginning/ (quoting Representative Carter).  Repre-
sentative Carter’s statements were described as a “not-so-veiled threat” and a reference to the bill 
he filed “to block the listing of the creatures.”  Id.  In late February 2013, Representative Carter 
and Senator Cornyn requested an extension to the comment period on the proposed listing of these 
salamanders.  Benjamin Wermund, Officials Ask for Extension of Salamander Comment Period, 
STATESMAN.COM (Feb. 26, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/officials-
ask-for-extension-of-salamander-comment-/nWZ9C/.   
 300.  Beth Wade, Cornyn, Carter Request Extension for Salamander Listing, AUSTIN 
COMMUNITY IMPACT NEWSPAPER, June 28, 2013, http://impactnews.com/austin-
metro/georgetown/cornyn,-carter-request-extension-for-salamander-listing/. 
 301.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 6-Month Extension of Final Determina-
tion for the Listing of the Georgetown Salamander and Salado Salamander, 78 Fed. Reg. 51129, 
51278 (Aug. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
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IV.  THE STRUCTURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT DELISTING AND 
EXEMPTION LEGISLATION 
The obvious political benefits associated with the recent wave of spe-
cies-specific delisting and exemption legislation provide one self-evident 
cause for the phenomenon: after all, such legislation allows its proponents 
to “look good in trying.”302  Part IV will explore further how such “not-so-
veiled” threats to species-specific delisting or exemption legislation dramat-
ically change the incentives and consequences for FWS during a conten-
tious listing.  In addition, Part IV will also explore the underlying causal 
factors responsible for these obvious political benefits.  In Sections A and B 
below, I describe and analyze the factors that make the recent species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation unusually efficacious, and 
therefore significant. 
Among other factors, the recent wave of species-specific delisting and 
exemption legislation is remarkably good at tapping into cognitive biases 
associated with egocentrism and identifiability.303  The strong relationship 
between these biases and this recent legislation helps to explain the legisla-
tion’s intense local and regional popularity as well as the difficulty in op-
posing this legislation, even at the national level.304  Moreover, the facially 
narrow nature of each individual piece of this legislation frames the eco-
nomic considerations in a way that is particularly useful for critics of the 
ESA but particularly problematic for advocates of biodiversity protec-
tion.305  In addition, I argue that due in part to past structural changes to the 
ESA, individual pieces of exemption legislation can be deployed by federal 
legislators as a new type of compellent threat.306  In more prosaic terms, this 
means that species-specific exemption and delisting legislation has given 
ESA critics an effective new tool—one which, as seen in Part III, can be 
used to influence a listing agency’s behavior even if the legislation is not 
passed.307  Thus, the recent burst of delisting and exemption legislation does 
far more than allow individual legislators to “look good in trying”—it al-
lows them to look good while trying and to help prevent a specific listing 
even if their legislation is not enacted.308 
                                                          
 302.  Taylor, supra note 166.   
 303.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 304.  See, e.g., supra notes 299–300. 
 305.  See infra note 310. 
 306.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 307.  See supra notes 211–215, 239–266, 285–300 and accompanying text. 
 308.  See supra note 167. 
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A.  Egocentrism and Identifiability 
As shown in Part III, individual delisting or exemption bills are ex-
tremely politically popular locally, and they can be used to simultaneously 
focus and amplify local opposition to a particular listing.309  At least part of 
the past, and likely future, local popularity of species-specific delisting and 
exemption legislation can be tied to cognitive biases related to egocentrism 
and identifiability.  These biases have salience in many environmental and 
natural resources debates, but individual examples of the legislation dis-
cussed in this Article tap into these biases in a particularly effective way 
given their ostensibly narrow local focus. 
The impact of the egocentric bias on environmental and natural re-
sources debates has been widely studied, including its impact on controver-
sies related to biodiversity.310  Stated in very general terms, the egocentric 
bias may be boiled down into something like the following: given multiple 
conceptions of what is fair, or faced with competing potential resolutions to 
a problem or conflict, people will tend to choose the most self-serving 
one.311  Of course this bias, as it is usually understood, is systematic rather 
than the vehicle for any attribution of individual moral opprobium: experi-
mental and observational data simply suggests that people tend to behave 
this way in a host of situations, with potentially tragic consequences in en-
vironmental and natural resource situations.312 
What are the potential pathologies of the egocentric bias in debates 
over biodiversity?  Consider the example of a dispute over fishery rights.  
Studies have shown that participants in such a dispute are willing to agree 
to equal reductions and to bear equal costs if the benefits and burdens of 
cooperation are symmetric.313  When the benefits and burdens become 
slightly asymmetric, however, such a solution becomes much more diffi-
cult, even when the existence of egocentric biases and the impact of such 
asymmetry on these biases are disclosed.314  Indeed, revealing the existence 
of such a bias can lead individuals to mistakenly believe that their behavior 
is socially cooperative.  In other words, revealing the existence of such a 
bias has an entirely counter-intuitive and largely perverse result: it causes 
individuals to believe that they are bearing an equitable or greater-than-
                                                          
 309.  See supra Part III. 
 310.  See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 260–61 (2000) (discussing examples of the egocentric bias, includ-
ing conflicts over bluefin tuna stocks). 
 311.   E.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 303, 330 (2004).   
 312.   Thompson, supra note 310, at 256–57.  
 313.  See id. at 260 (gathering studies).   
 314.  Id. 
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equitable share of, for example, the relevant costs of protecting bluefin tu-
na—even when they are consuming a disproportionate share of the relevant 
resources.315  For obvious reasons, this “one-sided halo effect” makes it ex-
tremely difficult to appeal to affected groups on altruistic grounds, as such 
groups are very likely to believe that the costs of resource problems should 
be imposed on those who are truly responsible for them.316 
It is easy to see this egocentric bias at work in the context of the recent 
delisting and exemption legislation as listing opponents deplore the cost to 
local economies imposed by distant regulators pursuing apparently remote 
and ephemeral benefits.317  Indeed, the recent burst of species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation is particularly well-suited to take ad-
vantage of the egocentric bias, thanks to each individual bill’s ostensibly 
narrow focus, as well as the alleged local economic costs it is designed to 
prevent.  The effects of the egocentric bias may be even more salient in the 
context of exemption legislation related to previously obscure or unknown 
species such as the dunes sagebrush lizard, which represents exactly the sort 
of problem that some scholars have suggested is particularly susceptible to 
this bias.318 
Similarly, the impact of the identifiability bias on environmental and 
natural resources debates has been widely studied, including its impact on 
controversies related to biodiversity.  Indeed, conflicts over biodiversity and 
the ESA specifically have provided some of the classic examples of the 
identifiability bias.319  The identifiability bias is the tendency to have 
stronger emotions related to specific and identifiable individuals or groups 
rather than abstract or unidentifiable ones.320  In other words, if we know 
the people affected by government action, we tend to care in ways that we 
usually do not if we are contemplating statistics, probabilities, and aggre-
                                                          
 315.  See id. at 260–61 (noting, for example, that “New England fishermen of blue fin tuna 
blame the decline in tuna stocks on long line fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico, who blame the 
problem on Mediterranean fishermen . . . who blame the problem back on the fishermen in New 
England”).   
 316.  Id. at 262.   
 317.  See supra text accompanying notes 205–210, 235–246, 252–256, 275–278, 295–302. 
 318.  See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 311, at 331 (“The egocentrism problem manifests itself now 
because many of the least expensive and most beneficial pollution reduction measures have al-
ready been undertaken. Thus, the first steps . . . exploited an enormous gap between the marginal 
cost and marginal benefit of abatement and made it possible to enact environmental legislation 
that accommodated both the environmental side and the regulated side in terms of their egocentric 
views of fairness.”). 
 319.  See, e.g., id. at 333 (explaining the identifiability bias through the example of Senator 
Gorton’s opposition to spotted owl preservation, who noted the terrible consequences of the ESA 
inflicted on “timber families” in the form of “abuse, divorce, adolescent depression and suicide 
attempts, bankruptcies, and illness”).   
 320.  Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 
437 (2008). 
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gate impacts.321  In general, the identifiability bias tends to pose special 
problems for environmental and natural resources law because the benefi-
ciaries of environmental protections or natural resource preservation tend to 
be less readily identifiable than do those individuals or groups who bear the 
costs of such laws.322  In other words, “[n]othing that proponents of envi-
ronmental regulation have come up with so far seems to trump the sympa-
thy that people feel for their identifiable fellow citizens that purportedly 
lose their jobs due to environmental regulation.”323 
The identifiability bias rests at the core of every instance of the recent 
wave of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation.  Every exam-
ple of this legislation turns on the alleged economic impact to local and re-
gional communities—and often to specific industries within those commu-
nities—inflicted by a specific new or continued listing.324  Indeed, this 
relentless focus on the distorting effects of identifiability may be the most 
distinguishing characteristic of the recent legislation, especially when com-
pared to the far broader, and historically far less successful, direct challeng-
es to ESA’s substantive provisions.325 
These effects of the identifiability bias are compounded by many of 
the usual problems associated with monetizing the benefits of biodiversity 
protection.326  As many scholars have noted, monetizing the benefits of bio-
diversity protection is inherently difficult,327 and attempts to do so often 
under-value biodiversity, especially when it is weighed against competing 
goods or services with relatively well-known market values.328  If the bene-
fits and value of biodiversity are difficult to monetize even in the abstract, 
they are virtually impossible to capture fully when one considers a single 
specific species.329  This task, of course, is exactly what is required by the 
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resolutely local focus of each ostensibly narrow, species-specific piece of 
delisting or exemption legislation in the recent wave.330  This legislation 
highlights the allegedly specific costs of a new or continued listing, framed 
by each individual piece of legislation’s ostensibly narrow focus, which, in 
turn, serves to limit or minimize the impact of any potential discussion of 
the aggregate benefits of protecting biodiversity.331  Accordingly, the recent 
spread, sudden success, and general political appeal of recent delisting and 
exemption legislation should come as no surprise: it is uniquely well-suited 
to take advantage of the identifiability bias. 
The special relationship of this legislation to the identifiability bias 
helps to explain its significance in ways that go beyond the explanation of 
its efficacy offered above.332  In many ways, the ESA’s outlier status, when 
compared to other examples of U.S. environmental and natural resource 
law, can be attributed to the fact that it functions as a counter-weight to the 
“common sense” operation of the identifiability bias.333  Part of the inherent 
appeal and significance of the recent wave of delisting and exemption legis-
lation is that it affords an apparent outlet for the hydraulic pressure created 
by this otherwise dammed-up and frustrated “common sense.”334  Indeed, 
the sort of “common sense” conclusions impelled by the identifiability bias 
are effectively baked into the individual pieces of delisting and exemption 
legislation themselves.335  In addition to helping to explain its popularity 
and its efficacy, this feature of the recent delisting and exemption legisla-
tion also underscores its significance: the importance and the novelty of this 
legislation’s challenge to the conventional understanding of the ESA rests 
in large part on its unique and inherent ability to compromise the ESA’s 
traditional role as a counter-weight to the identifiability bias. 
B.  The Recent Legislation as a Compellent Threat 
In addition to its exploitation of the biases described above, the recent 
wave of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation has also met 
with unprecedented success because individual examples of this legislation 
                                                          
to humans, there would remain certain dimensions of value—aesthetic or spiritual value, for ex-
ample—that are simply ‘impossible to quantify’ because they are incommensurable with econom-
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 330.  See supra Part III. 
 331.  See supra Part III. 
 332.  See supra note 241. 
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 450 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:389 
can function as compellent threats.336  Indeed, it is this feature that allows 
the authors of this recent legislation to do more than “look good in trying,” 
as such legislation can also be used to help prevent a listing, even if the leg-
islation itself fails to pass.337  Federal legislators have long wielded the 
weapon of potential or actual funding cuts or threatened broad potential re-
forms to the substantive provisions of the ESA in order to try to deter ac-
tivity by the listing agencies.338  Indeed, the history of the listing wars dis-
cussed in Part II is rife with such sweeping deterrent threats.  Due to the 
limited scope of its individual components, the recent species-specific 
delisting and exemption legislation offer, quite literally, a novel threat to the 
conventional understanding of the listing process.339  This feature helps to 
explain its recent and likely future success and appeal. 
To appreciate this aspect of the recent wave of delisting and exemption 
legislation, it is necessary first to briefly examine the distinction between 
deterrence and compellence, a term coined in the theoretical analysis of 
arms control negotiation.340  Although these concepts were first developed 
in a context that might seem remote from the listing process for endangered 
species, they are capable of yielding important insights into the structure of 
negotiation and conflict between agencies, legislators, and outside 
groups.341  This insight is especially useful in this context, given how thor-
oughly the rhetoric of violence and warfare has permeated not just the ver-
nacular surrounding regulation today generally,342 but especially the way 
that we talk about the ESA and the listing process more specifically.343 
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What, then, are compellent threats, and how do they differ from more 
familiar deterrent threats?344  Deterrent threats aim to turn aside or discour-
age through fear—to rig a trip-wire, to lay a minefield, or to point out a line 
of demarcation—because the fundamental aim of deterrence is usually to 
contain, rather than to roll back.345  Compellence and compellent threats are 
less familiar; or rather, the language that we use to describe them is less fa-
miliar.346  Compellence, unlike deterrence, requires a person to initiate a 
threatening action that is credible when made, but that may cease or lose its 
sting if the opponent responds favorably, involving notions of coercion, 
compulsion, and collision.347  Compellent threats also may be more limited 
in their nature: while the very act of making a compellent threat may inflict 
pain, some measure is also held in reserve.348  Of course, this means that a 
compellent threat also requires a degree of definition and credibility regard-
ing its consequences to be effective in ways that deterrent threats, which 
may invoke great but indeterminate future risks if the relevant tripwire is 
crossed, may sometimes lack.349 
This initial understanding of deterrent and compellent threats leads to a 
final distinction with particular relevance to the recent delisting and exemp-
tion legislation—the timing of deterrence is often indefinite; however, the 
timing of compellence, conversely, is definite, and the timing and initiative 
are largely determined by the persons who are making the compellent 
threat.350  In other words, while compellent threats may require certain an-
tecedent conditions of specificity and credibility in order to be effective, 
once those conditions are met, compellent threats then reserve a degree of 
initiative to their makers that deterrent threats cannot provide.351  Indeed, 
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this reservation of the initiative is fundamental to the distinction between 
compellence and deterrence itself.352 
Armed with a better understanding of the distinction between deter-
rence and compellence, we can now see how the recent burst of delisting 
and exemption legislation has greatly enhanced the ability of ESA critics to 
make credible compellent threats.353  As discussed above, the history of the 
listing wars is rife with opposition by federal legislators to listing activity 
and the listing agencies.354  Until the recent delisting legislation, however, 
and to the extent that these legislative efforts could be characterized as 
threats against future activity by the listing agencies, they have overwhelm-
ingly tended to take the form of general deterrence.  Reducing funding to 
the listing agencies, or attempting to do so, is a very blunt threat in terms of 
influencing future action by the listing agencies, and it is of little help in 
rectifying past or present listings.355  It is true, as was seen in Part II, that 
such legislative efforts may have had species specific flashpoints, but as a 
guide to specific future listings these provide only brief flashes on a long 
and dark battlefield: to the extent that funding cuts have had any success in 
motivating or altering the listing process, it is only by turning aside or dis-
couraging listings through fear of the potential general consequences.356  
Unsuccessful attempts to substantively revise the generally applicable terms 
of the ESA serve as an even blunter cleaver, which, if anything, is even 
more clearly a deterrent rather than compellent threat, especially given the 
dismal record of failure such efforts have endured over the course of the 
listing wars.357 
In contrast, the recent wave of species-specific delisting and exemp-
tion legislation functions as a compellent threat: it is definite, limited, and, 
particularly in the exemption context, it can cease or lose its sting if the list-
ing agency responds favorably by declining to list the species.358  While un-
successful attempts to rewrite the general provisions of the ESA may have 
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functioned as improbable, albeit potentially dramatic, consequential deter-
rent threats, each individual piece of the recent delisting and exemption 
wave has the potential to function as a much more precise and potentially 
effective compellent threat.359  Thus, such legislation may also be particu-
larly attractive to listing opponents because, unlike the deterrent threats of 
the past, such species-specific compellent threats allow listing opponents 
the opportunity to retain the initiative and control over timing of their oppo-
sition.360  After all, as seen in Part III, delisting or exemption legislation is 
often deployed several times, and at times determined by its authors, serv-
ing to focus and amplify local, regional, and industry opposition to an exist-
ing or potential listing.  Moreover, such legislation would now seem to have 
the credibility necessary to be deployed even more effectively in the future, 
given the multiple avenues to success demonstrated by the gray wolf delist-
ing legislation and the dunes sagebrush lizard exemption legislation respec-
tively. 
In sum, because the recent species-specific delisting and exemption 
legislation can be used as a compellent threat, it allows ESA critics to do 
more than “look good in trying”361—it allows them to look good while try-
ing and it affords them multiple avenues for success.362  The authors of 
such legislation obviously succeed if the legislation passes, but they can al-
so succeed if such legislation succeeds in compelling the listing agencies 
toward a compromise short of listing or an administrative delisting, which 
might obviate any need for the legislation.363  These multiple avenues for 
success are part of the reason why the gloomy predictions made regarding 
the recent legislation and its 1987 predecessors are so apt.364  Species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation has provided listing opponents 
with a powerful and precise tool capable of eroding the ability of the listing 
agencies to negotiate, and now that the tool has been used successfully, the 
same pattern seems ready to repeat itself again and again, “with no end in 
sight.”365 
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C.  Transforming the Ark: The Fundamental Challenge Posed by 
Delisting and Exemption Legislation 
The previous sections of Part IV have identified the fundamental caus-
es for the unprecedented success enjoyed by federal legislators who have 
advanced the recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation.  
This legislation is particularly significant precisely because it has proven to 
be such a new and effective tool for critics of the ESA.366  In this Section, I 
will argue that this legislation poses an unprecedented challenge to the con-
ventional understanding of the ESA for reasons that go beyond the underly-
ing causes for its recent, and likely future, success. 
To appreciate the true significance of this recent legislation, it is nec-
essary first to step back and recall what makes the ESA such a distinctive 
outlier amid the larger cost-benefit turn.367  It is also necessary to consider 
the present and potential future impact of the recent delisting and exemption 
legislation as an aggregated whole, in addition to the factors that tend to 
make each individual example of this legislation so useful for its supporters 
and so difficult for the listing agencies and environmental groups to re-
sist.368  As noted above, the ESA has not entirely resisted any and all ac-
commodation with economic considerations.369  After all, forty years of 
practical implementation, bitter conflict, and negotiated compromises have 
created a measure of “wiggle room” in which economic considerations have 
a role to play, even in listing decisions.370  The ESA, rather, remains a dis-
tinctive outlier amid the broader cost-benefit turn because its absolutist val-
ues still function as powerful “trumps,” which serve as unusually powerful 
counterweights to the influence of economic considerations that has trans-
formed other areas of environmental and natural resource law.371 
This “trumping” effect is at least partially expressive: the rhetoric of 
the ESA’s absolutist norms matters, in practically demonstrable ways, in 
debates about specific species or the value of protecting biodiversity gener-
ally.372  In addition, this trumping effect changes the structure of the negoti-
ations between environmental and economic interests under the statute, 
providing a balance weighted toward environmental protection and counter-
acting the inevitable tug toward economic interests that tends to prevail in 
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environmental and natural resources law.373  Both the expressive and the 
structural trumping effects of the ESA’s absolutist norms have survived 
decades of challenges.374  They may also survive listing exceptions for the 
gray wolf, for the dunes sagebrush lizard, and perhaps for a handful of addi-
tional species in the near future.  The expressive and structural trumping ef-
fects of the ESA, however, are unlikely to endure if the current pace of spe-
cies-specific delisting and exemption legislation continues indefinitely.375  
Every successful instance of this legislation corrodes the expressive force of 
the ESA’s absolutist norms.376  At some point, if the present pace of such 
legislation continues, insisting that Congress has specifically excluded such 
considerations from the listing process will ring hollow indeed.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the structural trumping effect of the ESA’s absolutist 
norms is also directly and practically subverted if listing opponents can 
readily achieve legislative delisting, or use it as a threat to compel agencies 
and environmental groups to compromise in their approach to the ESA’s 
gateway provision. 
Each individual instance of delisting or exemption legislation must be 
understood as a real rejection of the Noah Principle at the heart of the listing 
process as it is conventionally understood, because each such piece of legis-
lation represents an unmistakable attempt to incorporate economic consid-
erations directly into listing decisions.377  Yet at the same time, each suc-
cessful use of exemption or delisting legislation creates only the slightest of 
compromises to this fundamental and formal rejection of economic consid-
erations.  This combination is lethal.  Individual instances of species-
specific delisting and exemption legislation enjoy the efficacy of past lim-
ited exceptions to the enforcement of the ESA, and they embody all the 
promises of piecemeal assaults upon the Act identified by its longtime crit-
ics who have learned from their failures during decades of long conflict.378  
At the same time, however, the likely future aggregate impact of this recent 
legislation is at least, if not more, potentially significant and transformative 
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of many of the failed past and present attempts to broadly revise the funda-
mental substantive principles of the ESA itself. 
The recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation is a 
near-perfect weapon for critics of the conventional understanding of the 
ESA.  Its relationship to deep-seated cognitive biases virtually ensures that 
it will be politically popular, at least on a local and regional scale.  Its abil-
ity to be used as a compellent threat makes it difficult to resist while provid-
ing its supporters with multiple avenues for success; the true significance of 
the recent species-specific delisting and exemption legislation’s aggregate 
threat is obscured, in part, by the ostensibly modest limits of its individual 
components.379  This is the heart of the challenge posed by the recent ex-
emption and delisting legislation.  This legislation threatens to leave the ark 
holed at the waterline, leaking from myriad tiny holes, and adrift on the 
same currents that have transformed so much of environmental and natural 
resources law in recent decades.380 
V.  CONCLUSION 
What can be done, and what should be done, if the recent burst of spe-
cies-specific delisting and exemption legislation continues at its current 
rate—or if its current rate increases?  It may be too early to provide a full 
answer to these questions, but it is not too early to begin thinking about 
what the right answer should look like.  Nor is it too early to begin thinking 
about the obstacles that will confront such a response. 
For those who think that the listing process has wrongly excluded eco-
nomic considerations, the answer might seem simple: nothing.  Those who 
believe that efficient extinction is not a bad thing, at least in some circum-
stances, might view this recent legislative activity with equanimity, or even 
welcome it, as a long-overdue incorporation of local costs into the listing 
process.  Such a response would be mistaken.  I have argued here that the 
recent delisting and exemption legislation has proven to be unusually suc-
cessful, and it will likely continue to succeed, in part, because it taps into 
deep-seated cognitive biases that make it difficult to consider the benefits of 
protecting biodiversity.  These very features also make this type of legisla-
tion unsuitable for dealing with biodiversity and extinction. 
For those who think that the listing process has rightly excluded eco-
nomic considerations, the answer might also seem simple: nothing.  Those 
who would defend the conventional understanding of the listing process 
might weigh the relative novelty of this recent legislation against the long 
history of ESA conflict.  They might argue, based on this historical record, 
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that the sturdy ark, which has seen off so many past storms, will surely 
weather this disturbance as well, even if a few more exceptions are made 
along the way.  They might also argue that any repairs would be worse than 
the current danger: perhaps any reform of the ESA sufficient to forestall 
delisting or exemption legislation would change the Act more and in worse 
ways than simply tolerating some measure of such legislation.  Such a re-
sponse might also be mistaken.  While it is too soon to know the full impact 
of species-specific delisting and exemption legislation, I have argued here 
that this legislation will likely become an increasingly powerful and nega-
tive force for change.  And at any rate, as the story of the ark tells us, it is 
never too soon to plan for rain. 
